

Grupo de Lectura de Filosofía de la Ciencia

Discutiendo *An Epistemic Foundation for Scientific Realism: Defending Realism Without Inference to the Best Explanation.*

Wright, John (2018): *An Epistemic Foundation for Scientific Realism: Defending Realism without Inference to the Best Explanation*, Epistemology & Philosophy of Science, Synthese Library.
(<https://www.springer.com/us/book/9783030022174>)

CALENDARIO

Viernes, marzo 29:

Cap. 1 Introduction: Realism and Reason.

Cap. 2 The Skeptical Arguments against Realism I: Inductive Skepticism.

Presenta: María del Rosario Martínez Ordaz

Viernes, abril 12:

Cap. 3 The Skeptical Arguments

Viernes, abril 26:

Cap. 4 Realism and Inference to the Best Explanation

Viernes, mayo 3:

Cap. 5 On the Inference to Unobservables

Viernes, mayo 17:

Cap. 6 Underdetermination and Theory Preference

12:00-14:15 hrs | Viernes quincenalmente

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<https://www.mariamartinezordaz.com/phil-sc-reading-group.html>