It is from playing the lyre that both good and bad lyre players are produced.

*Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics*

Is it even always an advantage to replace an indistinct picture by a sharp one? Isn't the indistinct one often exactly what we need?

*Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations*

"The most crucial clarification about teaching occurs at the level at which we decide what kind of interaction it is," writes Joseph Dunne (1997, p. 367). "A decision at this level has the heaviest consequences not only for how we understand but also how we go about doing it." Dunne is right, of course. What kind of endeavor we understand music education to be—and more specifically, of what kind of interactions it should consist—has profound importance for the way music educators teach. It is also crucial to how we structure curriculum, to the kinds of experiences in which we expect students to engage, to the ways we evaluate student progress, and to how we orient and conduct our professional research. At first gloss, there is nothing particularly noteworthy or controversial about this. The "interactions" in which music educators are engaged are straightforwardly concerned with teaching their subject, music. Music education is, self-evidently, the business of helping students develop musically: to understand, appreciate, respond to, create, and to engage meaningfully in music. The concerns of music education are coextensive with the concerns of musical instruction, and musical instruction consists of the techniques and methods for developing things like musicianship, literacy, or appreciation. In short, music education is the means to ends that are specifically musical. That being the case, the most important guidance as to the nature of the discipline and its instructional concerns flows from a proper understanding of music's intrinsic nature and value.

Or is this right? There are a number of difficulties in starting with music, its nature and its value, and conceiving of music education as the machinery for teaching and learning about it, or developing proficiency in it. One such difficulty is that music's nature is not enough in itself to establish that it should be taught to or learned by all. Suggestive though it may be for many aspects of instructional method, curricular choices and priorities generally stem from considerations not immediately addressed by music's intrinsic nature. Furthermore, music's value is radically plural and diverse, and capable therefore of orienting instruction and curriculum in quite a variety of potentially disparate directions. And finally, however unique the nature of music, however much we may value it, the troublesome facts remain that it is not essential to life and that many of the putative outcomes of musical study are not highly valued by society at large.

Music is without question a ubiquitous presence in human societies, and musical propensities are clearly among the more remarkable and distinctive attributes of the human animal. Music also affords us experience that is unlike any other, extending to us humanly unique ways of being in the world. However, striking and indisputable though these facts about music may be, they do not in themselves establish a need for education in it, particularly where time and resources are finite and in short supply.

One strategic counter to such concerns is that, inessential though music may be to life, it is indispensable to a life lived well, or to a life worth living. It can, taught and learned well, impart rich meaning and purpose to people's lives.1 Music, and therefore education in it, is crucial to human flourishing, or *eudaimonia* as the ancient Greeks called it. Music teaches us things about our common humanity that are worth knowing, and renders us less vul-
nerable to forces that subvert or compromise human well-being. Studying and making music changes who we are and what we expect from life.

There are important elements of potential truth in such claims. However, it is also true that none of them follows automatically, unconditionally, or absolutely from musical instruction and musical experience. Each is profoundly contingent, dependent on such concerns as what music is taught, in what context, and how. Nor are these putative outcomes strictly musical: They are functional or utilitarian, concerned less with education in music or about music than with education through music, and interested in what use that might be. Our understandings of music's nature and value of music are necessary, indeed crucial, to music education. They are not, however, sufficient.

In this chapter, I ask what it may mean to become educated through music, or to become musically educated as opposed to being taught music or being musically trained. I am interested in discerning, in other words, what kind of interaction music teaching might be when undertaken with fully and specifically educational intent. Using the educational lens in the designation “music education” brings concerns and insights into focus that have far-reaching consequences for the way we conceptualize our instructional, curricular, and research efforts. I begin by exploring what the educational commitment implicit in the phrase music education entails: what, beyond the effective delivery of instruction or the transmission of sophisticated skills and knowledge, the word “educate” implies. Among my conclusions is that education is distinctively ethical in character, concerned ultimately with the development of character and identity. In the second major section, I explore the nature of the ethical mode of being and its significance for our understandings of education more broadly and music education more narrowly. A distinction between technical reason and practical wisdom figures prominently in these deliberations, as I argue the inadequacy of technical means to educational ends. I conclude by offering a few suggestions as to how the issues explored here might, taken seriously, transform musical instructional practices, understandings of the music education profession, and through these, implicitly, assumptions about the presumed range and focus of music education research.

Musical Education, Instruction, Schooling, and Training

What does it mean to be or become educated? What essential characteristics distinguish it from formative experience that is not educative? What attributes, dispositions, or virtues do we hope to find in educated individuals that we do not necessarily expect to find in those who are trained, perhaps quite effectively, yet not educated? This last way of putting the question begins to draw what to me is an interesting and important distinction: a distinction between instruction carried out with educational intent and instruction whose primary concern is to train. Although this distinction should not be pushed too far, I suggest it is a useful conceptual tool for refining our understanding of what educating musically entails.

The position I advance here is that the designation “music education” brings with it commitments, values, and obligations that have not always been at the forefront of our professional consciences, and for reasons related to the subordinate role “education” has played to “music” in defining our professional identity. It is entirely possible to teach and make music well while failing to achieve its educative potential. Roberta Lamb’s stinging indictment of musical performance suggests just how egregious such oversights can be. “Musical performance,” she alleges, “is untheorized practice. It is not praxis; it is what musicians do because it is what we do. . . . Performance is about control by a master, a conductor, usually male, usually white.” These assertions raise quite a number of issues, on levels too numerous to explore here. The primary point I wish to underscore is that this failure to “theorize practice,” to reflect critically on the ends to which our musical and instructional practices may lead, leaves open the very real possibility that our musical engagements miseducate rather than educate. Now obviously, musical performance is not inherently or invariably about power and control. Nor is teaching. Yet both may be, and often are. Music making and musical instruction may indeed be constructive, but what they construct is not desirable inherently or automatically. Approached without due consideration for what besides “the music” is being learned, the skilled performance of beautiful music may even be harmful. Musical instruction can humanize, but it can and arguably often does dehumanize. Thus, as David Best has persuasively argued, education in the arts has an utterly inescapable moral dimension: “No teacher,” he writes, “can avoid the moral responsibility of deciding what to teach and how to teach it.”

Focusing so closely on the musical part of the “music education” equation leads music educators to gloss the educational side, with consequences not just potentially troublesome, but at times highly undesirable. When we neglect the distinction between education and training, we risk conflating the two and accepting the latter as an acceptable substitute for the former. This potential is particularly worrisome in North American societies that valorize technical reason and the development of “practical” skill above other forms of mindfulness and expertise. Exclusive reliance on music’s allegedly intrinsic nature and value for our understanding of music education thus elides concerns that belong at the very heart of the latter.
The reasons for this preponderant emphasis on music in conceptualizing music education are many and varied. Some have to do with institutional arrangements, the historical influence of the music conservatory for instance, and the typical location of music education curricula within schools of music rather than faculties and colleges of education. Others have to do with the highly practical or instrumental nature of North American musical instruction since its early days in the singing school. Others may be traced to the uncritical equation of education with schooling, wherein music education’s role is simply “to school” children in musical “subject-matter,” and all teaching/learning activities directed to that end are deemed casually to be instances of music education. These institutional and historical influences lead us to speak of music education, musical instruction, and schooling, as if they were the same, and as though any instance of musical teaching and learning were an instance of music education.

Other reasons for our emphasis on music to the detriment of education stem from the politics of schooling, where advocacy efforts struggle to persuade skeptical others that music brings things to the instructional table that no other school subject can. Such efforts have often encouraged us to draw a sharp distinction between music’s ends and aims which are wrongly regarded as extramusical in this context. Advocacy efforts struggle to persuade skeptical others that music brings things to the instructional table that no other school subject can. Such efforts have often encouraged us to draw a sharp distinction between music’s insides (attributes and capacities presumed to follow from its intrinsic, or properly musical, nature and value) and its outsides (its extrinsic values). These well-intended strategies often lead advocates to valorize the properly or wholly musical values of music over its lesser, supposedly “extramusical” ones. Because educational ends and aims are wrongly regarded as extramusical in this narrowly dualistic scheme, many of the features that distinguish instructional processes and outcomes that are properly educative from those that are not have been neglected in our philosophical and research efforts, as well as in our understandings of what music education is and why it is important. Indeed, efforts to establish our uniqueness in the instructional milieu of public schooling often come precariously close to situating music outside that milieu altogether. So utterly distinctive is a music education defined exclusively by music’s intrinsic nature and value that it appears to fall outside what many people are inclined to regard as education.

Ironically, school-based music education often eludes close scrutiny on such grounds precisely because of the preponderantly technical orientation of modern schools, and their pathetically narrow vision of human purposes. It is relatively easy to demonstrate, after all, that music students are developing concrete skills and understandings, and that we are therefore “adding value” just like the “other” disciplinary areas. However, to return to the main point, this fails to address the larger concern of what kind of value is being added, or whether that value is educationally positive or negative. It fails to distinguish education from training, or to distinguish musical instruction with educational intent from musical instruction whose impact extends no further than training.

Indoctrinating, Training, and Educating

Again, what is education, and what might music in particular have to contribute to instructional efforts dedicated to specifically educational outcomes? How might our collective professional efforts differ if we were to take up the explicitly educational claim in the label “music education”? It may help to frame the conception of education I want to advance if we consider the other end of the instructional continuum: the indoctrination implicit in Lamb’s indictment of musical performance as control. The potentially adverse effects of indoctrinative instruction are well expressed in Pink Floyd’s “We don’t need no education, We don’t need no mind control...” and in this poignant admonition by Doris Lessing:

Ideally, what should be said to every child, repeatedly, throughout his or her school life is something like this: “You are in the process of being indoctrinated. We have not yet evolved a system of education that is not a system of indoctrination. We are sorry, but it is the best we can do. What you are being taught here is an amalgam of current prejudice and the choices of this particular culture. The slightest look at history will show how impermanent these must be. You are being taught by people who have been able to accommodate themselves to a regime of thought laid down by their predecessors. It is a self-perpetuating system. Those of you who are more robust and individual than others will be encouraged to leave and find ways of educating yourself—educating your own judgment. Those that stay must remember, always and all the time, that they are being molded and patterned to fit into the narrow and particular needs of this particular society.”

Mind control and education lie at opposite ends of an instructional continuum, with training variably situated somewhere between the two. Like indoctrination, training is highly directive. Control and management of the learner may not be total, as is implicitly the case for indoctrination, yet to be trained is to be prepared to execute a specific task or tasks. Education has different ends in mind. Training, as Peter Abbs (1994) points out, invariably involves a narrowing down of consciousness to master certain techniques or skills. These... are known in advance and can be unambiguously imparted by the trainer and assimilated by the learner. What is transmitted is functional and predetermined, a set of skills matching a set of operations. (p. 13)
Thus, training seeks to impart skills or techniques designed to serve some aspect of the status quo; it seeks to shape behaviors to prespecified ends. Education, by contrast, involves what Abbs describes as "an opening out of the mind that transcends detail and skill and whose movement cannot be predicted." It does not have, he continues, "a direct utilitarian purpose; it leads to a certain mode of consciousness, a delicate, sustained reflective disposition toward experience, an openness toward potential truth and possible meaning, though it generally presupposes the internalization of various skills and techniques" (Abbs, 1994, p. 15). The essential dynamics of education, observes Abbs, always take the student "beyond the status quo into what is not fully known, fully comprehended, fully formalized. Education is the expression and development of a primary impulse for truth, a deep epistemic instinct that we inherit as part of our biological nature" (Abbs, 1994, p. 16).

The product of this process, the educated person, is one who has acquired in the learning process not just a set of skills and understandings but complex sets of values as well: values that are held neither lightly nor dogmatically. The educated person is also one who is capable of acting and thinking both cooperatively and independently, able to judge when circumstances warrant "going with the flow" and where they require the courage to stand out from what Northrop Frye (1988) called "the uniform bleating of the herd" (p. 18). To be educated is to be responsive to the needs of others yet capable of self-reliance, able to think and act on one's own, guided by one's own sense of rightness. Accordingly, the educated person approaches new experience open-mindedly, with a capacity to weigh rival claims judiciously and to examine issues from alternative points of view and value orientations. Part of what it means to be educated is to be resourceful, agile, and flexible, to be able to discern what is important in novel or unfamiliar circumstances and to adapt where necessary.

Education, Growth, and Identity

In short, and in rather strong contrast to training whose efficacies is gauged by the successful execution or application of transmitted skills and understandings, education has an open texture. Indeed, education always "takes its chances," as the range of things the educated person may question or challenge extends even to the specific skills and understandings initially part of one's own educational experience. Education, then, does not just equip people to execute specific tasks. It empowers them to transform tasks where necessary, to judge when or whether such interventions are appropriate, and even to question or reject things deemed incontrovertible in previous instruction. Clearly, we are talking now not so much about what a person knows or can do as the kind of person one has become as a result of those knowings and doings, the attitudes and dispositions that orient and motivate an individual. Education creates people who have not only the capacity but the inclination to question, to look at things from various perspectives, and who are aware of the partiality and fallibility of all such perspectives, their own included.

This last claim may sound like a weakness, but it is one of the distinguishing strengths of an educated individual. While training has relatively clear-cut ends and determinate points of arrival, education does not. This is because education consists, as Dewey maintained, in an open process of growth and becoming that requires as a fundamental condition of its possibility the revision of one's beliefs and desires in light of new information and experiences. Education habituates inquiry, and nurtures experimental dispositions. It does not teach us what to see but how to look; not what to do but how to refine and improve our doings. Richard Rorty (1989) brings these points together this way:

This notion of a species of animals gradually taking control of its own evolution by changing its environmental conditions leads Dewey to say, in good Darwinian language, that "growth itself is the moral end," and that to "protect, sustain, and direct growth is the chief ideal of education." Dewey's conservative critics denounced him for fuzziness, for not giving us a criterion of growth. But Dewey rightly saw that any such criterion would cut the future down to the size of the present. Asking for such a criterion is like asking a dinosaur to specify what would make a good mammal or asking a fourth-century Athenian to propose forms of life for the citizens of a twentieth-century industrial democracy. (p. 201)

On this view, education fails if it prepares people to deal with unchanging circumstances in a static social order, for such states of affairs are seldom if ever found in the world of human endeavor (Dewey, 1934). Thus, instruction with educational intent always takes its chances. Its outcomes are multiple, potentially divergent, and even indeterminate in the sense that we cannot stipulate beforehand what specific form they may take. As Hannah Arendt writes, in educating, we prepare people for "the task of renewing a common world" and in doing so extend to them the "chance of undertaking something new, something unforeseen by us" (1961, p. 196). We can thus characterize what it means to be musically educated in general terms only, not in terms of objective requisite musical skills or understandings. This is because what we are ultimately concerned with as educators are the attitudes, propensities, and dispositions acquired through study that is musically educative. Our educational concern has to do
with how to approach life and living (and others engaged in those same processes) as a result of having engaged in musical studies and experiences of certain kinds, not with the studies themselves or what they explicitly impart about music. This is not to suggest that these latter are somehow dispensable to becoming musically educated. Clearly, they are not. But necessary though they undoubtedly are, they are not sufficient. And among the vast array of skills, understandings, and experiences that are properly musical, not all are equally suited to educational ends.

If education is not primarily concerned with the transmission of skills and knowledge, how does it work, when it works, and how can we tell when it has? One of John Dewey's answers that is particularly relevant to music education focuses on the quality of experience and its transformative potential: education works by changing in fundamental ways what we expect of life and experience. Experience is not all of a piece, Dewey shows: some has within it qualities and conditions that impart a marked sense of wholeness, unity, self-sufficiency, and vividness. Undergoing experiences of this kind changes who we are by elevating what we expect of experience, of life, of each other. Education works through experiences whose vividness and richness fundamentally change the bodies with which we are equipped with skills and concepts to be deployed and applied in more or less the manner in which they were acquired, and in situations for which the skills and concepts are specifically designed—which is to say, technically. Training and technique are highly useful, but often not outside the specific domain within which they are crafted. The concrete particulars of novel situations call for something more flexible, improvisatory, and amenable to reformulation than technique, something less susceptible to "method" than training. Hence, another characteristic of the educated individual is a tendency to hold to specific ideas and skills provisionally, in recognition of their potential limitations and their contingency.

If and when education succeeds, it does so by changing who we are: no change, no educational outcome. We become educated as we come to recognize the fallibility of what once seemed irrefutable; as we become more discerning of what we expect of subsequent knowledge and experience; as we become more fluent and agile at assessing things around us; and as we become more passionate about things that manage to surpass the level of the mundane. Such capacities cannot be dispensed technically, methodologically, step by step, and in clear succession toward a clearly delineated, preordained goal. Nor can they be measured by standardized tests because of the diverse and unpredictable ways in which they may manifest themselves. These capacities are not so much things the educated person "has" as they are things he or she has become. They are part, in other words, of one's character or identity.

Now, if our concern is not so much what one knows and can do as who one becomes through educative processes and experiences, education is clearly concerned with identity, the construction of selfhood of a certain kind, and the formation of fundamental dispositions. That being the case, education is a doubly ethical undertaking: double because decisions to cultivate certain habits and dispositions and to suppress others have unavoidable ethical implications; and because the kinds of dispositions one hopes to cultivate and nurture are themselves ethical in important ways. Abbs puts it this way: "Education exists primarily to engender virtue—a thinking that actually works through and on existence and which therefore develops the personality. Teaching is an ethical activity and education is, in part, the act and art of releasing a critical-ethical process in the other, the final outcome of which cannot be known in advance."

Let us turn then to the pivotal question of the nature of this ethical domain that figures so prominently in the distinction I want to draw between training and education. Without that, we shall be at a loss to understand what it might mean to be musically educated, and what if anything there is in music that might make it an appropriate vehicle for a distinctly educational enterprise.
The “Between-ness” of Ethical Encounter

The word “ethics” conjures up all manner of confusion and controversy, and its philosophical terrain defies easy navigation. So I will proceed here by advancing a particular view rather than conducting a comprehensive survey. I will draw on a thoughtful essay by Geraldine Finn in which she explores what she calls “the question which is ethics,” and the relationships between ethical thought and practical or political action. In a statement that resonates richly with the kinds of distinctions I have been attempting to tease out between education and training, Finn declares that,

an ethics which relies on the (political) categories of established thought and/or seeks to solidify or cement them—into institutionalized rights and freedoms, rules and regulations, and principles of practice, for example—is not so much an ethics . . . as an abdication of ethics for politics under another description. As it exchanges the undecidability, the anarchy, the responsibility of the space-between of the ethical encounter with others for the security, the hierarchy, of the pre-scribed and prescriptive places of the categories.

Crucial to this account of practical ethics is the point that a great deal of what is conventionally called ethics simply is not. Formulation and adherence to rules of conduct, for instance, is not at all “ethical” in the sense Finn advocates. The truly ethical encounter takes place only when categorical assumptions are bracketed, when one sets aside the comfort and security of preordained rules, regulations, and procedures, in an effort to encounter the other as concrete other rather than simply as an instance of something already familiar. Such an act requires openness and puts one in a position of vulnerability. And importantly for our purposes here, it cannot be executed by adhering to explicit procedures or methods.

Central to Finn’s account of the ethical encounter, properly so-called, is the “space-between” where it is situated. This is the phenomenal space between category and experience, between language and life, between representation and reality. In it, one regards who or what one encounters (the other) not as an exotic variant of something familiar and subsumable under a categorical label already at hand, or amenable to treatment along lines suggested in some abstract regulative ideal. It is imperative, as Finn sees it, that in a truly ethical encounter the other be recognized as a concrete, unique particularity. Failure to do so distorts the other, treats it as “more of the Same,” reducing the potentially ethical encounter to a merely technical one.

More to the point, an ethical encounter that fails to question the political status quo that frames it, the particular vision of the “good life” in which the issue at hand is en-meshed (and by which it is to some degree defined), implicitly endorses that vision’s adequacy. She explains,

Ethical praxis which merely rearticulates the values and goals of the status quo realities identified as problematic for it, seems to me to consist not so much in ethical interventions directed towards fundamental issues of right and wrong and the constitution of the good life, as technical—and for that reason, political—interventions directed towards the fine tuning of norms and procedures already in place to accommodate new realities within the system which might otherwise disturb its hierarchies of power and control or its appearance of Reason and Right. Thus, much of what passes for “ethical” . . . is not really ethical at all from this point of view, but technical-political in the given sense.

In other words, by accepting a system’s premises and basic categorical assumptions, the parties in potentially ethical situations unwittingly preempt the transformative power of genuinely ethical inquiry. They tinker with symptoms rather than addressing the problems that give rise to them. Their resistance only serves to reinforce and sustain the status quo. If the existing norms and values of society were adequate to experience, if language were commensurate with life, or representations were adequate to reality, there would be no dissent or disaffection. However, Finn says, “the contingent and changing world always exceeds the ideal categories of thought within which we attempt to express and contain it. And the same is true of people. We are always both more and less than the categories which name and divide us.” People’s lives leave remainders (“say more than they mean”) just as categories leave residues (“mean more than they say”), says Finn.

In an authentically ethical encounter, one encounters things in their concrete particularity rather than as instances of the familiar. Subsuming a person or a thing within an existing scheme “relieves us of the ethical responsibility of attending to the particularity of the other and inventing our relationship with it.” By contrast, the between-ness of the ethical encounter “puts me in the presence of that which has never been there before: the other in all its singularity . . . an epiphany, an absolute exteriority which cannot without violence be integrated into the Same” (Finn, 1994, p. 108).

The categorical schemas of institutionalized discourses channel the “affective anarchical ethical residues and remainders of experience . . . into authorised categorical hierarchical meanings, intentionalities, and desires compatible with and amenable to the controlling interests of prevailing political powers” (Finn, 1994, p. 109). The substitution of technique for ethical encounter, an act that carries within it an implicit endorsement of the integrity of the status quo, is an important part of the machinery by which prevailing power is sustained. Hence, to reject the certainty and security of technical rationality for
between-ness and openness of the ethical orientation is often denigrated as irrational or soft-headed by those privileged within a given order. The ethical attitude is regarded as aberrant, confused, a kind of experience that needs to be cleaned up and perfected by reason. Thus, while the between-ness of the ethical encounter makes it the only encounter that “makes a difference and demands a responsibility from me which is not already pre-scribed” (Finn, 1994, p. 111) that transformative potential often goes unrealized. Such is the hegemony of technical rationality, the impersonal manipulation of ideas, whose advocates would have us believe its rules and methods are our only reliable epistemic resources.

My concern is to emphasize the liberative and transformational potentials of the ethical mode of being. Ethical presence-to-the-other makes profound demands on its agents. It requires that they accept and embrace personal responsibility for constructing their relationship to the other, and, concomitantly, that they be willing to yield something of themselves as formerly constituted. In Finn’s words, ethical presence to the other requires one “to think and be anew: to risk being-otherwise-than-being what I have already become” (Finn, 1994, p. 111). It “puts me into question, which challenges and changes me, as well as the other . . . and the socius/the system which contains and sustains us.” The ethical is, in short, “a praxis which will cost me something if it is effective. A praxis of the absolutely particular for which there can be no rules, no principles and no guarantees. A praxis of risk and responsibility in which, I believe, lies our only hope for real political change.”

The uncertainty and between-ness of this ethical mode of knowing/being contrasts starkly with the sovereignty and control assumed by technical rationality, the de facto norm by which the worth of instruction is so widely gauged. But the point is, technical reason does not comprise the whole of our rational powers and clearly has its limits. The ethical encounter deploys a rationality of its own, and is not just potentially educative, but in a pivotal sense, considerably more so than the theoretical and technical enterprises in which instruction invests so overwhelmingly. Finn points to another way of knowing, one deployed and at home in the realm of practical human interactions, and one that draws demandingly on our full powers of creative consciousness. The ethical encounter is grounded in commitment, caring, and responsibility. The question that lies at its heart (the question which is ethics) arises in the confrontation of good with good.

Episteme, Techne, Praxis, and Phronesis

Since it has potentially far-reaching implications for the way we conceptualize education and, hence, musical instruction with educational intent, I want to pursue further this intriguing account of ethical engagement and the kind of knowledge required of the ethical agent, and to do so through Aristotle. While we often associate his name with the syllogism and its logical rules, Aristotle explicitly acknowledged the existence and importance of three distinct kinds of knowledge, or three ways of knowing. Theory (episteme), or pure contemplative knowledge, was concerned with timeless universals. By contrast, there are ways of knowing that are practical and more personal in nature, the kinds of knowing deployed and exercised in the changing situations of human makings and doings. This domain of practical knowledge or personal know-how takes two distinct forms: techne, the technical/procedural know-how exemplified by the making-actions of the skilled craftsman, and praxis, the experiential resourcefulness (or wisdom, perhaps) by which people navigate the social/political world. In other words, Aristotle described two kinds of know-how, of personal or action knowledge: techne and praxis. Part of what distinguishes the latter from the former is the kind of situation in which it is deployed. The other distinguishing feature of praxis, and the one in which I am primarily interested here, is what one might call its guidance system. Praxis is grounded in and takes its guidance from phronesis, an ethic concerned with right action in the variable and unpredictable realm of human interactions. Praxis is tightly tethered to the concreteness and particularity of experience on the one hand, and to one’s identity or selfhood. Thus, praxical know-how is fundamentally reliant on the processual monitoring of this personal ethical fluency called phronesis. Techne, on the other hand, is more akin to what we sometimes call “method,” a kind of knowledge that, though practical, can be detached from the person whose knowledge it is and transferred or taught to others. It has a kind of generality that renders it “portable” between different situations and contexts.

Let us set Aristotle’s episteme aside, concentrating for the moment on the distinctions between his two modes of practical knowledge. Recall that it is the conflation of these two modes of knowing, the reduction of ethics to technique, that concerns Finn. That is my concern as well, for the distinction has important consequences for our effort to shed light on the educational significance of musical studies and musical experience. If, as I believe they are, education and music are praxes (instances of praxis), they are fundamentally reliant on guidance by this ethical/phronetic fluency; and if that is so, then approaching them technically threatens to neutralize the mode of encounter essential to the realization of truly educational outcomes. Useful though techniques and methods are within certain spheres of activity, they lack the characteristic betweenness of ethical space. The problem is captured vividly in a passage from Wittgenstein:
The more narrowly we examine actual language, the sharper becomes the conflict between it and our requirement. (For the crystalline purity of logic was, of course, not a result of investigation: it was a requirement.) The conflict becomes intolerable; the requirement is now in danger of becoming empty. — We have got onto slippery ice where there is no friction and so in a certain sense the condition is ideal, but also, just because of that, we are unable to walk. We want to walk: so we need friction. Back to the rough ground!

The difference between logic’s “crystalline purity” and the messiness of ordinary conversation, between the slipperiness of ice and the sure footing afforded by rough ground, parallels that between techne and praxis in interesting ways. Technical rationality is perfectly fine in its domain, as ice is fine for skating. However, talking and walking require grounds better suited to those ways of getting around. We need language that lends itself to our practical discursive needs, and footing whose “grip” enables us to change direction as necessary. The point that began to emerge in our consideration of Finn can now be made more fully explicit. The ethical attitude she describes is the means by which we maintain our bearings in the concrete, ever-changing world of everyday experience. And because that is so, the kind of fully engaged presence it demands can hardly be regarded as an educational luxury. Such experience is, to borrow a phrase from Gadamer, “perhaps the fundamental form of experience compared with which all other experience represents a denaturing.”

Techne, in contrast, is a practical knowledge applied to making-actions instead of human interactions. Its end, envisioned at the outset, guides one’s actions and provides a relatively stable measure for gauging successful action. Dunne (1997) argues, further, that even though techne is not theoretical in the purely contemplative sense of episteme, it nonetheless has many of the hallmarks Aristotle attributed to theory: “a concern not so much with particular instances as with a knowledge that is explanatory, generalized, systematic, and transmissible, and is at the same time a source of reliable control over the facts that it brings within its ambit” (1997, p. 228). To the extent techne is interested in generality, replication or reliability than particularity and concreteness, more interested in controlled accuracy than in qualitative richness, it gravitates more toward the theoretical pole than the practical one.

However, Dunne continues, “Much in the conduct of practical affairs depends on singular judgments which cannot be derived from, and answer to epistemic conditions different from those of, idealized [technical, abstractive] discourse” (1997, p. 381). Praxis is not some vague, deficient version of episteme or techne, then. It is not just well suited, it is utterly essential to “right action” in the here-and-now, real-time, human social world. And importantly for our purposes here, it is an experiential, personal knowledge, rooted in one’s sense of who one is. Praxis requires presence or close attunement to the particular occasion, an attunement which assures one’s actions are directed to the “right person, to the right extent, at the right time, with the right aim, and in the right way.”

We might say, then, that praxis is unavoidably contextual. It is a situation-specific knowledge and is therefore finite and contingent by nature. It has an inescapable element of hazard, which it retains no matter how proficient one becomes, because each new start is in crucial ways a new action/event. It is also vulnerable or fallible, Hannah Arendt observes, in its dependency “upon the unreliable and only temporary agreement of many wills and intentions,” because of which it cannot “be possessed like strength or applied like force.” Thus, praxis demands of the agent/knower a deep engagement or involvement, a high level of alertness, and a flexible responsiveness to changes in the experiential field.

Praxis is “lighter on its feet” than the making-knowledge that guides techne, because its terrain is that of human interaction where unpredictability, complexity, and change are norms. Unlike technical know-how, praxis has no clear-cut, preordained outcome to which it can turn for guidance or validation. Praxis takes its bearings from a phrasonic sense of what is important and appropriate as the experience unfolds in time. Because of the particularity and unpredictability of its terrain and its requisite responsiveness and flexibility, phronesis is talk-like, conversational. It holds its convictions provisionally, reassessing and revising them in light of what other participants contribute. As experiential knowledge, praxis is not just at home with the possibility of surprise; its comfort with the unexpected is central to effective guidance within fluid, here-and-now circumstances. Among the distinctive traits of phronesis is openness to the unforeseen, comfort with being-in-play, improvisatory quickness. An important part of what distinguishes an “experienced” person is precisely a “readiness for” and openness to further experience. In Dunne’s words, “To be experienced does not mean to have had one’s surprises so that one is now proof against any new ones but, on the contrary, to have learned to be at home with the possibility of surprise as a permanent possibility inseparable from historical existence itself.”

As we have been seeing, because phronesis is not instrumental and because it is concerned with concreteness, experience and perceptiveness are the primary assets of praxis, not formulated knowledge. The root of phronesis is a “refined sense of the contingencies of a particular situation,” an ineffable yet reliable sense for what Sparshott calls “the nerve of a practice.” Phronesis enables one to discern what is significant and how to act rightly in diverse
The words I am using to describe phronesis resist my desire to portray it as a processual fluency rather than an inert "thing" or abstract "capacity." So I must reassert the crucial point that phronesis, this ethical disposition on which praxis relies so fundamentally, is not some "thing" one first possesses, then applies. It is part of one's very character, inseparable from one's identity. "Phronesis is not a cognitive capacity that one has at one's disposal but is, rather, very closely bound up with the kind of person that one is," comments Dunne (1997, p. 273). "All genuine phronesis," he remarks elsewhere, "is absorbed into action—action as an ineluctable movement that a person can never step out of" (1997, p. 268). One does not so much deploy phronesis as enact it. Nor is the identity or character to which it is so inextricably linked abstract and disembodied. This ethical mode of being present to otherness does not take guidance from some detached intellectual regulatory mechanism but from one's entire being. One's corporeality or embodiment is thus a profoundly important dimension of phronesis. One's sense of how best to make one's way in unfamiliar situations is mediated by the body, and not casually. As one feels one's way forward, the sense that finds one lead or possibility compelling, and another barren, is deeply rooted in the body. Einstein's claim that his sense of discovery was muscular in character is a case in point.

Pierre Bourdieu puts it this way:

Practical belief is not a state of mind, still less a kind of arbitrary adherence to a set of instituted dogmas and doctrines (beliefs), but rather a state of the body. Doxa is ... the pre-verbal taking-for-granted of the world that flows from practical sense. Enacted belief, instilled by the childhood learning that treats the body as a living memory pad, an automaton that leads the mind unconsciously along with it, and as a repository for the most precious values ... is the product of quasi-bodily dispositions, operational schemes, analogous to the rhythm of a line of verse whose words have been forgotten, or the thread of a discourse that is being improvised ... Practical sense, social necessity turned into nature, converted into motor schemes and body automatisms, is what causes practices ... to be sensible, that is, informed by a common sense. It is because agents never know completely what they are doing that they do more sense than they know.

Every social order systematically takes advantage of the disposition of the body and language to function as depositories of deferred thoughts that can be triggered off at a distance in space and time by the simple effect of replacing the body in an overall posture which recalls the associated thoughts and feelings, in one of the inductive states of the body which, as actors know, give rise to states of mind.47

The body, Bourdieu continues, "does not represent what it performs, it does not memorize the past, it enacts the past, bringing it back to life. What is 'learned by the body' is not something that one has, like knowledge that can be branded, but something that one is."48 This bodily basis of practical sense or know-how, the ineffable feel for which course of action may be "right" in novel circumstances, lies at the heart of phronesis.49

It is well worth noting that what we are discussing here is not "human instinct" in any transcendent or universal sense, and that the identity with which this bodily dimension is so intimately intertwined is a contingent one that is always under construction. Our bodily actions build on habits and on the firing of neural pathways whose routing depends on the contingencies of personal experience. Phronesis is thus borne of the habits, needs, purposes, and actions of each of us individually, and the kind of guidance it affords is, although grounded in human bodies that are alike in many ways, deeply personal because of the uniqueness of each individual's experience. This personal nature of phronesis is a central reason it cannot be passed directly or mechanically from one person to the next. To the extent it is deeply personal, such knowledge is both "subjective" and tacit. Yet, as Michael Polanyi demonstrated so compellingly, such knowledge must not be regarded for those reasons as unreliable or somehow dispensable to human endeavor.50

Finally, because embodiment, action, and agency are crucial components of phronesis, it is a fundamentally social phenomenon. Phronesis, comments Dunne, is "an enactment through which [people] constitute themselves as persons in a historical community. It is through praxis that a person comes to have an individual identity, but at the same time it always transpires within an intersubjective medium."51 Thus, phronesis is no less than a "medium for becoming through action" (1997, p. 263). It is, one might say, a prime instance of a doing, that constitutes a being.52

Education and Phronesis

This chapter began by examining differences between education and training. I trust that the parallels between that discussion and the techné/praxis contrast are sufficiently evident that they require no elaboration. But before turning directly to music education, let us return briefly to the aims of education, examining them against the background
of the ethical/phronetic strand of action/knowledge I have been attempting to illuminate. How does our acknowledgment of the between-ness of practical judgment refine or qualify what we might want to claim for the educated person, the human needs and tendencies to which education ministers?

First, I hope we might be inclined to grant that one of the central aims of education should be that phronesis become an abiding disposition, that phronetic dispositions become features of one's identity. Flexibility and openness to experience, convictions held provisionally and sustained by experimental attitudes, discernment and acceptance of what is unique in a given situation: Surely these are educational virtues. They are educational virtues in no small part because of the ballast they provide against the human tendency to dogmatism and stereotype. It is easier to see what is familiar than what is distinctive, far easier to use the perceptual and conceptual tools that are in wide circulation than to construct and reconstruct one's own in cooperation with others. But stereotype and dogma are fundamental obstacles to transformation and progressive change. They are tools of oppression, and deliver a view of human possibilities as all-or-none, black-or-white. The realm of human meaning is, as Dewey insisted, wider, more urgent, and more fertile (1958, p. 410). The person for whom phronesis has become an abiding disposition is one who recognizes and appreciates the urgency and fertility of knowledge that may not conform to logic's crystalline structure.

That is not to say that logic, reason, and generalizable knowledge do not have their legitimate place. They do, of course. But it is an important educational advance when fascination with their remarkable rigor is balanced by awareness of their restricted sphere of validity. The point of emphasizing phronetic dispositions is not to dispute the efficacy of theory and technique but to remind us of their limitations and consequences, and to reassure us of the integrity of a way of knowing and living beyond the jurisdiction of technical discourse.

Second, capacities like improvisatory resourcefulness and agility, the creative and constructive impulses at work in phronesis, are important reminders of the fluidity and malleability of human knowledge and of the necessity for openness and flexibility in human affairs. They alert us to the essential role the knower plays in all knowing, and of the intersubjective ground on which all knowing ultimately rests. The nerve of phronetic action is, as we suggested earlier, conversational. It is inseparable from the ethos in which it arises, and is never available to us as a technique. It has neither a preordained structure nor outcome. It arises and is carried forward by a "lack" on both sides.

Third, phronetic experience is proof of the integrity of action. Neither creativity nor discovery can know its outcome at outset, and both are guided by what Michael Polanyi describes as a “deepening gradient of coherenee,” not by rules. In an ever-increasingly “managed” society, it is crucial we recognize that such profoundly important things as conversations and creativity and discovery cannot be perfected through management, they must be ministered to. An education that nurtures and sustains our trust in phronetic dispositions may be our best hope of preserving such essential capacities as these.

Fourth, a commitment to educating for phronetic dispositions has significant implications for the way instruction occurs and for the kind of interaction we understand it to be. If our aim is to foster ethical awareness, appreciation of the importance of the between-ness of the ethical encounter, the power and authority vested in teachers as purveyors of knowledge and judges of skill must somehow be softened and decentered. Since phronesis is not the kind of disposition that can be technically dispensed or “managed,” it must be exemplified in teachers’ attitudes and relationships to students. Fallibilism and openness to unexpected outcomes would need to become prominent features of instructional style, as would such ethical concerns as commitment to justice, mutuality of respect, and so on. Moreover, learners would have to be given rights of intellectual disagreement, provided they are first able to state views they oppose in ways acceptable to those who hold them. In other words, deliberate steps would need to be taken to assure that the power and authority that come of knowledge are not abused, but wielded lightly. Teachers would have to be seen not as dogmatic authorities, but as members of the community of learners.

If we take as given that technical and theoretical rationality are constitutive of reason, then phronesis, itself neither technical nor theoretical, is, by syllogistic logic, irrational. But it is precisely the point here that “reason” so construed does not exhaust the rational capacities of which humans routinely avail themselves. In fact, if we look at people's everyday deeds and actions, we see that they are engaged extensively in undertakings that, while not irrational, proceed entirely without recourse to theoretical or technical rationality. The problem with “reason” and the “logocentrism” with which it is closely allied is that we have placed inordinate emphasis on reason’s “epistemic functions,” writes Nicholas Burbules, and neglected the “moral and political dimensions that are actually at the heart of decisions about what to believe and how to act” (1995, p. 83). The postmodern “rage against reason,” while justified in certain respects, is really directed at reason conceived as a narrow, rigid, and exclusively logical instrument—or in the terminology I have been using here, a technique or method. However, reason can be reconstructed in ways that avoid the evils attributed to it by postmodern critics without capitulating to abject relativism.
or nihilism. What is needed, Burbules argues, is a more inclusive and flexible understanding of reason, one more accommodating of such things as pluralism and diversity, and one more modest in its presumed sphere of validity. Drawing from Charles Taylor and Richard Rorty, respectively, Burbules points out that rationality involves more than avoiding inconsistency, and that reason "names a set of moral virtues: tolerance, respect for the opinions of those around one, willingness to listen, reliance on persuasion, not force." What we require, Burbules concludes, is a character-driven view of reason, one distinguished not for its strict adherence to logic but for its qualities of reasonableness.

"A person who is reasonable wants to make sense, wants to be fair to alternative points of view, wants to be careful and prudent in the adoption of important positions in life, is willing to admit when he or she has made a mistake, and so on" (Burbules, 1995, p. 86). A reasonable person is also one who is able to engage others in debate about beliefs and values, but conversationally rather than in an adversarial manner, and with the objective of reaching understanding rather than winning. In contrast to the individualism of Cartesian reasoning, reasonableness is very much an intersubjective, socially interactive achievement.

However, and this is particularly important in light of the emphasis on tolerance and plurality I have been advancing here, reasonableness requires a fundamental critical strain as well. By failing to resist the status quo when required, one becomes part of the machinery that perpetuates it. Thus, where circumstances are unreasonable, as they often are, it may be unreasonable to act reasonably. After all, to be reasonable does not mean one's mind is so open one's brain falls out; and tolerance for "many" cannot mean just "any." The educated person, like the human agent guided by phronesis, is at once open and discriminating, at once tolerant and critical, at once patient and passionate, at once cooperative and independent, and at once confident and humble. If the proper balance between and among these is not something amenable to formula or rule, that is precisely the point we have been pursuing. Because of commitment to principles like fairness, equality and justice the educated person is tolerant of ambiguity, complexity, and diversity. Yet not infinitely so: the educated person is trusting, but not gullible. And so, an educated person is one who, while respectful of and open to the views and values of others, also has the courage and means to think and act independently where necessary. Many of the virtues of education are, as Frye reminded us, social vices: the tendency, for instance, to question "received wisdom," "common sense," and authority. It is therefore imperative that education allow learners the latitude to pull away from "the kind of well-adjusted social behavior that leads to security, popularity, and the death of the free mind" (Frye, 1988, p. 72).

**Musical Education as Ethical Interaction**

I have suggested from a number of perspectives now that education requires Wittgenstein's "rougher ground" as a fundamental condition of its possibility. While my arguments may have been suggestive, though, we have yet to ask explicitly what all this has to do with music, or how music may fit into such a scheme. How might the idea of educating through music, and of teaching for ends like those described here, reorient our conception of music education and the kinds of interactions of which it should consist? How might recognition of music education's moral and ethical dimensions alter our views of what curricular practices and experiences are desirable? In what ways might an educational emphasis reorient our assumptions about the proper focus of musical instruction and research? In what ways is musical experience well suited to the ethical and educational aims discussed here? Under what circumstances is it not? Reasonable though it may be to conceive of education as an ethical undertaking, is it right to think of musical experience itself as an ethical encounter—and particularly well suited to developing the kinds of dispositions we have suggested characterize the educated? Is the act of making music itself ethical in some sense, or do such acts only resemble the ethical encounter in certain interesting ways?

Because the scope of this essay does not permit full treatment of each of these issues, some of them must await exploration elsewhere. My conviction, however, is that music and music education are indeed ethically significant enterprises and I want to suggest some ways in which it may be fruitful to consider them so. Because many regard the distinction between "moral value" and musical value (apparently synonymous, for some, with "aesthetic" value) to be a crucial philosophical advance, however, several preliminary points are necessary. First, ascribing an ethical or moral dimension to musical experience does not entail reducing all musical value to moral or ethical value, any more than acknowledging that music is fundamentally social means it is nothing but social. I am not proposing the reduction of musical value to moral value. Rather, I am urging recognition of a musical dimension obscured by historically formalistic philosophical enterprises. Second, to say music is an ethical space or constitutes an ethical encounter is not to claim that engaging in music makes one morally good or upright. Such a claim would entail the very means-ends relationship whose absence distinguishes practical ethics from technique. Nor is it being suggested that curricular decisions be guided by some ex-
licit, identifiable moral character supposedly implicated in music.

I do think it may be reasonable, however, to suggest that certain musical endeavors and experiences can develop dispositions that are potentially useful in other ethical situations. Musical experience has the potential to impart ethical dispositions, and to exercise the kind of phronetically guided experience that is the *sine qua non* of practical wisdom. It can achieve this, however, only if it is experienced or learned in ways that foreground betweenness and nurture the attitudes on which practical judgment relies. There are musics, modes of instruction, and ways of experiencing music that are poorly suited to nurturing and sustaining such dispositions, and still others that threaten to extinguish them. Just as lyre playing begets both good and bad lyre players, music can be taught and experienced in ways that subvert its ethical potential or divert its unique power to undesired ends. Engaging in musical instruction with educational intent requires we attend to what is being performed, experienced, taught, or learned besides the “music itself.” In particular, it should make us wary of the idea that “if it sounds right it is right.” Surely, one of the important insights attending recognition of music's ethical capacity is that sounding right and “being right” do not necessarily go hand in hand.

Our concern in this chapter is to formulate an understanding of music education by asking not what music is, but by asking first what we want or need education to do for our children and society, and then asking what musical experience has to offer. The question becomes, then, in what ways may particular musics and instructional practices be well suited to ends that are specifically educational? The desire to share one's passion for music with others is both laudable and crucial to musical instruction. But it is important to remember that this passion is a function not just of what music is, but of our experiences with it, and what and who we have become through such experiences. Likewise, although it is defensible and pedagogically sound to urge that music be taught and experienced in ways that enable people to know it authentically, it is equally important to recall that knowing about music or making it well does not automatically constitute educational outcomes.

To illustrate the potential significance of this point, consider David Elliott's argument that music education should be multicultural. The ground for his claim is that since music is multiple and culturally situated, musical instruction must make these musical facts apparent. “If [music] consists in a diversity of musical cultures, then [music] is inherently multicultural. And if [music] is inherently multicultural, then music education ought to be multicultural in essence.” Only, these facts about music's nature are, even if valid, insufficient to establish either that music should be taught or that it should be taught multiculturally. That is because a descriptive claim (music is...) does not in itself implicate a normative one (education about it should be...). Perhaps, then, *music education* need not be multicultural even if we are in agreement that *music* is. And perhaps the more important consideration as to how music education should be conceived and conducted lies in “oughts” or normative considerations that may be, for educational purposes, prior to music's nature.

Let us examine several issues here. If music has an essence and that music is indeed multicultural, then it would seem to follow that the truer musical instruction and curriculum are to this essence, the more radically multiple must be the musics studied and experienced. But this authentic grasp of music's multicultural nature would obviously entail unacceptable sacrifices to meaningful engagement in a single music. Perhaps, then, limited instructional time and resources might be better invested in efforts to nurture students' capacities to experience one music deeply and meaningfully, regardless of music's multiplicity. Or perhaps the abundant diversity of Western art music is sufficient to sustain an authentic grasp of music's inherent multiplicity. It might even be argued that music's diversity is so radically multiple that it can neither be taught nor fully grasped, and that instructional priorities should be guided by more manageable concerns.

I am not disputing the validity of multicultural approaches to music education. I only want to point out that “ought” claims rely on our aspirations for education, on the kind of interaction we understand it to be, and on the kind of people and societies we hope to foster through those interactions. A multicultural claim for music education follows more compellingly from a transformative vision rooted in convictions about who we ought to become through musical experiences than from ontological claims, however justified, about what music is. In other words, musical multiculturalism as an educational ideal emerges more convincingly from concerns about people, oppression, tolerance, diversity, understanding, and sharing, than from an interest in knowing music adequately. Because education is concerned with selective cultivation, it cannot be infinitely inclusive. Therefore, educational philosophy is inescapably normative. One must choose, for instance, between the liberal ideal of breadth and the conservative ideal of depth. One must choose between the kind of knowledge that comes with diverse musical experiential roots and that which can only come from deep, sustained immersion in a particular practice. It is unlikely that both can be achieved in the same program.

The insufficiency of music's nature and value to educational ends does not mean that music is ill suited to the attainment of such ends. It means that the attainment of educational ends through musical experience is contingent rather than automatic. And it means that music education must be guided by discriminating judgment as to what mu-
sical and instructional practices do or do not constitute right action toward educational aims. Such instructional and curricular decisions comprise the most conspicuously ethical dimension of music education, because they concern the cultivation of habits, preferences, and dispositions, and ultimately, what kind of people our students become.

The implications are clear. Musical instructional arrangements and experiences should move students deliberately toward the attributes we have predicated of educational experience, while arrangements and experiences that nurture things like dependency and dogmatism should be avoided. It is difficult to imagine a music educator taking issue with these claims. And, yet, we need not look far to find musical and instructional practices that exhibit considerable tension with educational aims. The master-apprentice mode of applied music instruction, for instance, too often focuses on the imitative repetition to the detriment of educational ideals like independence, or the refinement of technical skills at the expense of curiosity, flexibility, and experimental-mindedness. Large ensembles where most musical decisions are made by a director may be better suited to nurturing conformity and submission to authority than self-reliance and creativity. Instructional approaches to music theory or history that dispense black-and-white answers and single points of view may neglect inquisitiveness and fail to help learners take initiative and responsibility for their own learning. Overreliance on the written score may cause students’ imaginations to atrophy. Music programs devoted predominantly to appreciative listening or aesthetic responsiveness may inadvertently train people for lives devoted to receptivity and consumption rather than action and production.

How Is Music Suited to Educational Aims?

Concerns like those I have just raised can be countered by modifying instructional practices, of course. They are not inherent in music, after all, only functions of the way it is taught and experienced. Music can be taught in ways that either support or subvert educational aims. But that is not a very strong case for music education, as presumably the same is true of most things. We can and should take our lead from education, then, but we need to return to music’s nature, and to ask what there is about music and musical experience that make them particularly likely candidates for instruction with specifically educational intent. When we turn to that task, several musical facts seem particularly salient. Music is a fundamentally social activity grounded in sonorous experience. It consists, furthermore, in ritualistic enactments of certain kinds of social relatedness. And the phenomenal character of musical engagements is unlike any other, as the musically engaged person becomes one with the music, or becomes what one writer memorably describes as a “body in a state of music.”69 These facts suggest a number of ways in which music, taught and experienced properly, may be particularly well suited to the educational aims we have been exploring in this chapter.

In the first place, musical engagement is in many respects a perfect example of the between-ness of the ethical encounter, because it consists in a process of becoming without a point of arrival. It is resistant, complex, fragile, elusive, and therefore deeply engaging. Sustaining it demands our full presence and the deployment of all the powers at our disposal. It requires an attitude of caring and commitment, an investment on our part. And because of this, it is not so much something done or attended to as it is a vital part of who we are. To the extent it is successful, musical experience stands as vivid evidence of the integrity of the nontechnical kind of knowing on which the educated person draws in copious amounts and with relative fluency.

Second, making music draws on the kind of experiential knowledge that is one with action and human agency. It requires and nurtures the kind of improvisational resourcefulness and agility that makes the educated person comfortable with the unforeseen and open to change, confident that the resources at hand can somehow be made adequate to the challenges presented by a novel situation or unanticipated circumstances.

Musical experience is, further, a fundamentally social phenomenon,70 which makes it well suited to exercising the cooperative and intersubjective understandings so crucial to attributes like tolerance, compassion, patience, and the ability to attend closely and empathetically to others. It is, as Charles Keil (Keil & Feld, 1994) urges, “our last and best source of participatory consciousness” (p. 20), a state sustained in important ways by the inevitable “participatory discrepancies” among players in the musical field and sounds they generate. However, it is not only social in this sense of being made with others, thereby satisfying what Keil calls the “urge to merge” (p. 217), it is also a potent tool in constructing and maintaining social identity. Musical activities are themselves ritual enactments of human social order.71 Therefore, musical experience offers us vivid evidence of the moral desirability of engaging with others in the creation of intersubjective, participatory meanings, and of our mutual reliance on one another in all human endeavors.

Music’s nature as ritual becomes crucial when we turn to what may be the most pivotal claim I want to make for music’s ethical and educational significance. This claim is that we are what we do, and do repeatedly. Music’s ritualistic actions and the dispositions that undergird them are fundamental to the formation of character, both collective and individual. More strongly still, music plays a fundamental role in the social production and regulation of identity. If music is an important part of the machinery by
Music and Performativity

One of the best-known advocates of this performative account of identity is Judith Butler, who first developed her argument in a provocative book entitled *Gender Trouble* (1990). Although I will not pursue the matter extensively here, it is important to acknowledge at the outset that this reference to gender is not merely incidental to the idea of performative identity. For among other things, identity comes in genders. If music is involved in the production and regulation of identity, and if such identity is gendered, it is possible to construe musical experience as variously implicated in the formation and management of gender, and thus enmeshed in issues of power and politics. This is not the place to argue these points, but it is important that we see the extent and significance of the terrain potentially opened up by the idea of music’s involvement in identity.

The main point of Butler’s theory is that identity is not so much given as created. And what is thus created is not a permanent, unchanging self, but a fluid self that is constantly being re-created, refashioned, and redefined. Identity is always a doing, then, but it is not the achievement of a human subject that may be said to exist prior to the deed (1990, p. 25). Instead, the agent, the self, or the doer (one’s identity) is variably constructed in and through its deeds and actions. Accordingly, what we consider “the coherence and continuity of the person” are not logical or analytical features of personhood, but, rather, socially instituted and maintained norms of intelligibility” (1990, p. 17).

So selfhood and identity do not reside in some durable or essential substrate. They are created, rather, through our actions, our interactions, and our language. Put differently, people’s identities are socially and discursively constituted. On this view, language “is not an exterior medium or instrument into which I pour a self and from which I glean a reflection of that self” (1990, pp. 143–44). Instead, the self is constructed in and through social and linguistic activity. Selfhood is “a sedimented effect of a reiterative or ritual practice” (Butler, 1993, p. 10).

The same claims may be made, I submit, for music. Music making and music listening are not mere exteriorities, activities in which a preexistent self engages, catching occasional glimpses of that self so engaged. Musicking does not give us insights into the patterns of human subjectivity so much as it shapes and molds subjective awareness and identity. As Eleanor Stubley shows so well, music making consists in “an ongoing tuning process in which the self is experienced as an identity in the making” (1998, p. 98). In nontrivial ways, selfhood and identity are created in and through musical activity. And to an extent far more significant than commonly acknowledged, people’s identities are sedimented effects of reiterative or ritual musical action. Self-growth is not music’s purview so much as self-creation.

Thinking of musical engagements as ritual enactments of different modes of subjectivity, of different kinds of community, and so on, takes us well beyond the borders of “music proper” as discursively constituted by aesthetic formalism. It obliges music educators to inquire what, besides “the music” (construed as expressive sonorous patterns), is being performed, enacted, and taught. Once we grant that the idea of “music alone” represents a kind of false consciousness, it becomes imperative to ask whether what is being ritually enacted in musical settings is ethically, morally, or educationally desirable. If personal and social meanings are not mere contextual variables but are themselves part of musical content, segregating musical meanings from personal or social ones is no longer something we can do in good conscience. It is concerns like these that lead Suzanne Cuzick to wonder if her faithful performance of an art song might serve as an “act of public obedience to a culturally prescribed script,” an enactment of self-suppression, obedience, and submission (1994, pp. 80–81). “Might my real work,” she wonders, “be that of demonstrating for you how submission may be most beautifully performed? Might I always be performing the role of a subaltern who knows her place?” (1994, p. 92). If, in short, identity is performative, and if repeated musical acts (including, incidentally, the act of listening appreciatively) become part of the fabric of our very selves, it is incumbent upon us as educators to ask whether sounding good is all there is to being good musically, and to remain ever vigilant about what in addition to expressive sonorous patterns is produced in our musical doings. This dialectically interactive tension between music’s formal and moral “goodness,” between actions that are technically or even musically successful and actions that serve important human needs, makes of music education an endeavor considerably more complex than the development of musicianship or proficiency. But that complexity and the demands it makes on educator, listener, and music maker alike are precisely what makes music so well suited to developing the phronetic dispositions so central to education.
These accounts present powerful testimony to the potential of music to contribute significantly to the attainment of educational aims, with all the complexity we have seen that entails. But music is not just another option, just another means to such ends. Its material groundedness in the body makes musical experience momentous, gripping, and compelling to a degree few other human endeavors can claim. The uniquely corporeal dimension of musical experience and its remarkable capacity to engage a unified mind-body suggest that music is exceptionally suited to educational ends. The elusiveness of the border between music’s capacity to soothe and noise’s capacity to disturb, and the necessity that the musically engaged person monitor that ever-elusive border make of musical experience a prime example of ethical presence-to-the-other: a here-and-now experience for which there are no absolute rules, no guarantees, and no safety nets. Musical experience may be our most vividly compelling proof of the necessity for non-technical experience to the human life well lived.

Again we must acknowledge the contingency of all this. The fact that we are involved in making or responding to or learning about music actualizes none of these potentials automatically. What we are talking about is music taught, engaged in, and experienced in ways ethically desirable and educationally fruitful. The features that make music such a potentially powerful educational tool also can be deployed to ends that are undesirable. There exist at least two kinds of impediment to the successful realization of the educational potentials claimed here for music. First, there are impediments that deprive music of the richness, complexity, and wonder of ethical between-ness. There exist at least two kinds of impediment to the successful realization of the educational potentials claimed here for music. First, there are impediments that deprive music of the richness, complexity, and wonder of ethical between-ness. The seductive lure of technique threatens to reduce education to training, teaching to “method,” thought to formula, creativity to recipe, spontaneity to calculation, agency to consumption, and action to mere activity. Equally serious are those untheorized musical practices that deploy music’s potency to ends incompatible with education. Such impediments to music’s educational potential should be among the music education profession’s most pressing concerns.

What Might These Points Mean for Music Education and Research?

It remains to say, in closing, how conceptualizing music education along the lines advanced here might change things. What real differences does it make? In the first place, it renders less obvious what music and music education are. It puts the disciplinary “self” into question in a way that blurs boundaries and raises a host of issues where remarkably few currently seem to exist. It demands that we seriously reexamine the focus and scope of our instructional, curricular, and research efforts. Without such questioning and reexamination, professional growth is scarcely possible.

It also suggests a dramatic shift in the kind of question that interests us. It leads us away from our currently technical (“how-to”) preoccupation, and toward questions like “whether,” “when,” “whose,” and “why.” It necessitates thinking of musical goodness in ways more complex and educationally relevant than those to which we have grown accustomed, and thinking of music in terms that extend well beyond the condition of its sounds. It strongly suggests that musicianship does not exhaust what the name “music education” commits us to developing. It requires that we learn to see musical instruction not as technical means to ends wholly musical, but as a process that exemplifies prudence, and that provides students with experiences replete with opportunities to exercise such dispositions themselves. It requires that we become more attentive to much of what we are currently and mistakenly inclined to regard as “context” or “extramusical,” and that we become much more resistant to attempts to separate music from the social ecology to which it owes its very existence.24

It suggests disenchantment with instructional and musical circumstances presided over by charismatic but dogmatic leaders, and it strongly implies an increased interest in musical processes like improvisation and creativity.25 It requires a more explicit acknowledgment of the limitations of schooling and how these impinge on our ability to educate there. It means drawing the disciplinary boundary for music education much more openly and inclusively than is currently the case, in recognition of the fact that much music education, properly so-called, goes on in places other than schools.

Most important, it demands a concerted collective effort to recover the profoundly important potential of musical experience to facilitate ends truly educational: to nurture the character and dispositions people need to thrive in unpredictable or unforeseeable circumstances; to cultivate the openness, inquisitiveness, and resourcefulness essential to the life lived well; and to assure that people recognize such a life is possible only where justice and fairness are carefully and tightly woven into the fabric of which it is comprised.

Coda

I began this chapter with a distinction between musical instruction designed to train and musical instruction whose intent is educational. Some will criticize this distinction for its perceived black-and-whiteness: for setting up a rigid dichotomy that misrepresents training and is inconsistent with the themes developed later in my chapter. I think a close reading will show that such criticisms misconstrue
my point. I have not argued that training is inevitably or invariably linked to dependence and inflexibility but, rather, that these are among its potentials, particularly when instruction is pursued without explicit commitment to (and systematic provision for) ends that are specifically educational. To train is not necessarily to educate.

The danger of misrepresenting training must be weighed, I submit, against the dangers of neglecting the distinction between training and education. The consequences of the latter are more grievous: the reduction of education to training; the substitution of technical fluency for ethical deliberation; the replacement of the practical knowledge at the heart of music making, teaching, and creativity with technical skill and theoretical understanding. My concern has not been to vilify training but to show that educational results do not follow automatically from musical instruction—even from musical instruction that is highly skilled or proficient. It all depends.

This contingency needs to be more salient in the conceptual frameworks that orient our research efforts, in the instructional concerns and practices we seek to illuminate through those efforts, and in our philosophical inquiry as well. It matters, and profoundly, what we mean when we presume to conduct research in the area of music education—where the boundaries of that disciplinary focus are drawn, what they are presumed to include or to exclude.

Research methods are only ways of investigating questions. Our research, therefore, can be no better than the questions we choose to explore. I hope I have shown that an explicit commitment to educating musically implicates a broader range and a different order of questions than have conventionally occupied our attention. The nature of educational commitments necessitates a concern with concrete situations and relations, an interest in the particularity of meanings, and a renewed recognition of the fundamentally ethical nature of music education.

NOTES

I wish to acknowledge, with gratitude, the many penetrating and challenging criticisms of an early draft of this chapter by numerous anonymous and semianonymous reviewers. I learned a great deal from them and the chapter is much better for their helpful insights.

1. This plurality and diversity of musical value may be reduced somewhat by restricting one's purview to "the art" of music. However, the precise nature and range of musical activity such a restriction entails, and whether such an exclusion is justified, remain contentious issues. If music is whatever people say or believe it is when engaging in it, its natures and values may well be innumerable.

2. Or in any case, they are not valued as highly as the outcomes promised by "other subjects of study." Here one thinks, for instance, of music education's traditional claims to develop the life of feeling, or awareness of the patterns of human sentence. Part of the problem with this is that contemporary society codes feeling as feminine, and confers upon such concerns a status profoundly subordinate to masculine reason. See Morton (1996).

3. It is well worth noting that this is true not just of music, but of an immense potential range of human endeavors, such that this claim by itself is rather insubstantial. Also needed are arguments about how the kind of meaning and purpose music potentially provides is more desirable or durable than other contenders. That is one of the objectives of this chapter, which should become apparent eventually.

4. This is a conventional claim. It is important to add, however, that it also teaches us about those things that make us different. I am indebted to one of the reviewers of this chapter for this important point.

5. The underlying point here is one that many thoughtful music educators and scholars have attempted to express for years: As a profession, we must be concerned with education through music more than instruction in or about music. What might be distinctive in my treatment is the idea that this unavoidably implicates an ethical obligation for musical instruction, an "ethical turn" for music education philosophy. The formalistic predilections of our conventional philosophical orientations have led, I submit, to serious neglect of what some might wish to characterize as the human side of music education.

6. While some readers might find this essay an "odd fit" for a research handbook, it is really not odd at all: The issues I will raise go right to the very heart of what music education is, what the "proper" object and range of music education research might be, and what means are best suited to the conduct of research in a discipline so construed.

7. An important caveat here. This distinction does not mean the differences between the two are insurmountable or absolute, or that drill and training are invariably negative, or that they are unavoidably opposed to education. Clearly, education relies and builds on training in important ways. But the fact that they are potentially interrelated does not mean that they are coextensive or that important distinctions cannot and should not be drawn. My point is that necessary though training may be to education, it is not sufficient. At issue is whether drill and training leave students better able to exercise independent judgment, or whether they ultimately give students more control over their lives or the skills and dispositions necessary to lives lived well. There is nothing wrong with an individual who is more knowledgeable or skilled telling or showing others what to do. Teaching involves cultivation, after all. The difficulty is that external constraints have a way of becoming internalized. We drill, train, or otherwise burden students legitimately and educatively if their freedom in the long term is enhanced by doing so. Drill and training contain an unavoidable coercive component, though, and instruction involves power and authority. The problem is to avoid subjecting students to arbitrary and excessive authority, making them dependent upon us for dependency's sake alone. A commitment to educating requires that the dependency as-
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associated with training and drill be temporary, and that the power and authority inherent in the instructional relationship be wielded lightly. The point, again, is that musical instruction is not automatically or necessarily educational. The advance or transition from training to education does not happen on its own: it needs to be the object of deliberate and strategic planning.

8. Lamb (1995), p. 126. It is worth noting that the term “praxis” is used here to designate “theorized practice” or practical engagement dialectically informed by critical/theoretical reflection.

9. 1992, pp. 180–81. Best goes on to assert that the decision to restrict one’s purview to the development of technical skills “is itself a great responsibility” (182).

10. This possibility is made all the more disturbing by the often overwhelming beauty of musical experience. This is a point made vividly by Cuzick (1994).

11. In Peter Abbs’s view, our neglect of true education and emphasis on technology have “erased[d] the thinker from the thought and ended in a landscape of dispossessed objects, systems without spirit, products without human purposes, closed questions unsupported by existential quests” (1994, p. 22). Part of what motivates this chapter is a conviction that, too often, musical instruction unwittingly serves these very ends.

12. Schools of music within North American colleges and universities evolved from music conservatories whose missions were straightforwardly to train professional musicians. This, along with the music education’s close alliance with the music schools into which these conservatories eventually evolved, has been an important formative influence.

13. Wherein training for specific performing and reading skills was the norm.

14. In which case “school music” would be a more appropriate name for the discipline. Although the point that schooling and education are not synonymous is fairly commonplace, for most intents and purposes “music education” in North America denotes “school music.” A broader conception of education would probably yield music education curricula substantially different from current configurations.

15. This in order to avoid the appearance of saying no more than “me, too,” and to advance the position that music has something unique to offer, rather than being just another way of achieving outcomes rightly claimed by studies in other areas. The danger, I obviously am implying, is that many of the things that may best secure the argument for music education fall within the territory thus characterized as extramusical, as less-than-musical.

16. My use of quotation marks here is in the first instance to signal the irony of the view that what education does is, like business, add value—surely indicative of technicist assumptions. In the second instance, my intent is to question the adequacy of the assumption that music is properly regarded as a disciplinary area. Both seem to me highly reductive.

17. Waters/Pink Floyd (1979). Lessing (1962), xxiii–xxiv. I found both in an insightful essay by Bennett (1995), pp. 73–81. I hasten to add that overt indoctrination may not be the limit case after all, since the kinds of injustice and inequity perpetuated systemically but remaining invisible and out of critical reach are probably more insidious.

18. Of practical knowledge, Bourdieu (1990, pp. 103–104) writes, “This practical sense, which does not burden itself with rules or principles (except in cases of misfiring or failure), still less with calculations or deductions . . . is what makes it possible to appreciate the meaning of the situation instantly, at a glance, in the heat of the action and to produce at once the opportune response. Only this kind of acquired mastery, functioning with the automatic reliability of an instinct, can make it possible to respond instantaneously to all the uncertain and ambiguous situations of practice.”

19. This is not to say that education and the wisdom with which it is concerned cannot be cultivated, of course; only that they are not amenable to technical development. Best (1992, p. 182) points to one of the basic ways in which such cultivation diverges from training when he writes, “[The teacher] must try progressively to avoid indoctrination, the imposition, even inadvertently, of his [sic] own prejudices. He [sic] must stimulate and encourage the progressive development of the student’s own attitudes, conceptions, feelings.”

20. Such recognitions are themselves without criteria, defy technical transmission, and are functions of character or identity.

21. I see these as intimately related, and will use them more or less interchangeably. Those who think of identity as foundational or essential rather than constructed may wish to maintain that character and identity are different on that count. Since I do not find essentialist accounts of identity persuasive, I see the notion of character as closely related.

22. Interestingly, Dewey (1916, p. 383) says that “If we are willing to conceive education as the process of forming fundamental dispositions, intellectual and emotional, toward nature and fellow men [sic], philosophy may even be defined as the general theory of education.”


24. Although his project differs from mine in many ways, John Richmond’s “Beyond Aesthetics and Meaning: Ethics and the Philosophy of Music Education” (1996) provides a useful overview of schools of ethical thought and their applicability to music education.

25. Finn (1994), pp. 101–116. The specific point of Finn’s essay is that feminists resist the temptation to debate ethical issues using rules and systems derived from and incorporating the values and assumptions of a patriarchal status quo—in particular, “the values of liberal individualism upon which the contemporary polis relies for its legitimation, reproduction and control” (p. 106). The point, in Audre Lorde’s memorable words (1984), is that “The Master’s tools will never dismantle the Master’s house.” Or as Judith Butler puts it, “[T]he feminist subject turns out to be discursively constituted by the very political system that is supposed to facilitate its emancipation. This becomes problematic if that system can be shown to produce gendered subjects along a differential axis of domination or to produce subjects who are presumed to be masculine. In such cases, an uncritical appeal to such a system for the emancipation of ‘women’ will be clearly self-defeating” (1990, p. 2). Although I have chosen to side-step...
the political point of the argument in my treatment here, I encourage readers to pursue it on their own. I would be irresponsible were I not to acknowledge that many features of my essay are informed by feminist convictions and deeply indebted to feminist theory, which has greatly challenged, broadened, and humanized my thinking and writing.

26. From the perspective of its critics, this act of suspending presuppositions can only result in nihilism. But as Judith Butler writes (in another context), “To call a presupposition into question is not the same as doing away with it altogether; rather it is to free it from its metaphysical lodgings in order to understand what political interests were secured in and by that metaphysical placing, and thereby permit the term to occupy and to serve very different aims. . . . [A] loss of certainty is not the same as political nihilism. On the contrary, such a loss may well indicate a significant and promising shift in political thinking” (1993), p. 30.

27. Eleanor Stubley (1996, 1998) has explored closely and sensitively the notion of an ethical, in-between space as it relates specifically to musical performance in certain settings. Indeed, her poetic treatment is more successful in many respects than the prosaic exposition I undertake here. The concept of between-ness also figures in her essay (1999) “Modulating Identities and Musical Heritage: Improvisation as a Site for Self and Cultural Re-Generation.”

28. Finn (1994, p. 104). There is interesting resonance between some of what Finn advances here and Theodor Adorno’s comment in Negative Dialectics (1973) that “The power of the status quo puts up facades into which our consciousness crashes. It must seek to crash through them” (p. 17).

29. Finn (1994, p. 107). Again, Adorno’s Negative Dialectics comes to mind: “Objects do not go into their concepts without leaving a remainder. Aware that the conceptual totality is mere appearance, I have no way but to break immanently . . . through the appearance of total identity. Since that totality is structured to accord with logic, however, whose core is the principle of the excluded middle, whatever will not fit this principle, whatever differs in quality, comes to be designated as a contradiction. Contradiction is nonidentity under the aspect of identity; the dialectical primacy of the principles of contradiction makes the thought of unity the measure of heterogeneity. As the heterogeneous collides with its limit, it exceeds itself. What we differentiate will appear divergent, dissonant, and negative for just as long as the structure of our consciousness obliges it to strive for unity” (p. 5).

30. Gadamer (1975, p. 324) calls this the “illusion of experience perfected and replaced by knowledge.”

31. My intent is not to deny the validity of technical reason within its proper realm, but to urge against its sufficiency or suitability (particularly in light of its ideals of objective detachment, abstract universality, and control) to the conduct of life more generally.

32. Finn (1994, pp. 113–114). The political change to which she alludes here is concerned with social justice. If music educators are hard-pressed to see the relevance of such issues to their professional practice I hope the remainder of this chapter may offer some strong suggestions. Note that Finn’s use of “praxis” differs subtly from Lamb’s cited earlier; nor is it the precisely same as the Aristotelian sense I will explore later. Advocates and critics of praxis-based accounts of music education would do well to recognize the diversity of meanings the term “praxis” carries. While that diversity is not nearly as radical as the semantic baggage that accompanies the term “aesthetic” it is no less important in discussions of praxis to stipulate in what sense the term is being used.

33. My choice of these words was inspired by a passage in Alasdair McIntyre’s After Virtue (1984).

34. These receive a close and highly lucid treatment in Joseph Dunne’s Back to the Rough Ground, on which I shall rely extensively in what follows. My primary concern here is to stress the contrasts between techne and praxis, the insufficiency of techne to praxis, and the potential educational consequences of failing to recognize such distinctions. As such, I will not explore the important relationships between and among theory, technique, and praxis. The idea of praxis is one of the orienting ideas for David Elliott’s Music Matters (1995). An inductive approach to puzzling out the distinctive features of praxically informed music education can be found in my “The Limits and Grounds of Musical Praxilism,” forthcoming in Elliott’s Critical Matters. The most detailed and thorough analyses of the idea of praxis as it pertains to music education can be found in Thomas Regelski’s recent work (1996, 1998a, 1998b).

35. It is worth noting that music was considered a techne in this scheme—a view, I submit, that must be regarded as misguided unless one restores to techne the integrity of which it is deprived when skill is regarded as mere manual dexterity. I believe praxis may be better suited to music, especially in light of its inextricably social nature.

36. The distinction between knowing-that and knowing-how is Ryle’s, and is used extensively by David Elliott in his philosophical accounts of music education. I draw attention to the fact that know-how includes both techne and praxis.

37. Please note that ethical here does not mean “moral” or refer to the sets of rules and codes that have become substitutes for ethical engagement in much of the modern world. The application of such rules approximates more closely what I call “technical rationality” here. In an important sense, recourse to rules amounts to an evasion of ethical responsibility.

38. Wittgenstein (1976), §107 (p. 46). This passage is the source of Dunne’s title, obviously.

39. I have been reminded by Eleanor Stubley that techne as Aristotle conceived it was not merely technical: it, like praxis, was personal and changing. The “mereness” of technical or technical rationality is not inherent in the making-actions of techne, then. It has, however, become a marked attribute of modern conceptions of technique.


41. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, quoted in Dunne (1997), p. 368). I make no claim to present a purely or authentically Aristotelian account of phronesis here. Rather, I draw my claims more broadly from the broad resources Dunne brings to bear on it in his book. It would probably be wise to distance the understanding of praxis/phronesis being advanced here from the Marxist view which, in portraying
moral life as a mere reflection of material production, develops what Jurgen Habermas argues convincingly is a highly reductive concept of praxis (Dunne, pp. 178–80).

42. Quoted in Dunne, p. 93.


44. Please note that "improvisatory" does not here mean anything like capricious, or hastily thrown together. Rather, it points to the skillful making of numerous decisions and developing their implications "on the fly," in the midst of ever-changing circumstances. To improvise is to act without absolute foreknowledge, to work without a safety net. These are, I submit, necessary conditions of the ethical encounter.

45. Dunne (1997), p. 133, interpreting Gadamer. In these respects, Gadamer asserts that the experienced individual is quite unlike the person "captivated by dogma."


47. Pierre Bourdieu (1990), pp. 68–69. Mark Johnson (1987) and George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (1999) provide fascinating accounts of the embodied nature of cognition that are useful in showing how embodiment functions beyond the realm of practical reason with which Bourdieu is primarily concerned in the passage quoted here.

48. Bourdieu (1990), p. 73). Musicians will find the passage from which this quotation is drawn particularly cogent, since it goes on to speculate about the "disincarnation" or bodily disengagement that occurs when music is objectified.

49. My treatment of corporeality here can be justifiably criticized as an overly brief and passing gesture. I invite the reader to consult Stubble's work for outstanding examples of writing that keeps musical/ethical experience more fully and properly embodied. I argue the centrality of corporeality to musical experience in Bowman (2000).

50. Polanyi (1958) does not address phronesis or the betweenness of the ethical encounter per se, nor does he stress the corporeal dimension. He does, however, advance a cogent account of the personal and tacit foundations of knowledge and the profound importance of such knowledge. See also my "Tacit Knowing, Musical Experience, and Music Instruction: The Significance of Michael Polanyi’s Thought for Music Education" (1981).

51. These are Dunne's words, as he explores Habermas's account of praxis (p. 176). The distinction between technique and praxis is at the core of Habermas's critical philosophy.

52. Put differently, it is an action that generates what it enacted. This idea of "performativity" will be examined more directly in the final section of this paper, specifically with regard to the musical construction of identity.

53. Again, I suggest this deepening gradient is extensively mediated by the body.

54. Adorno often described modern society as "totally managed."

55. This is particularly true of an undertaking like music instruction, one might argue. Joyce Bellous (2000) of Mc-Master University writes: "The problem with talent and identity in the musical arena has to do with the totality of the teacher's involvement over the learner—body, mind, and spirit. To be musical, and to develop the gift, the child's body is taken over by someone else who knows how the body should stand, look, posture itself, move, when and where. The influence of the musical teacher over the musical student is far more intrusive than the math teacher over the math student. Music didn't used to be the only discipline that did this. The English teacher, and every other teacher, had something to say about how the learner sat, held a pencil, looked toward the front and conveyed attentiveness. I think it is fair to suggest that only music remains in the domain of body management in this sense, and to the extreme that it does. Surely this must be seen as radically intrusive" (p. 39).

56. This is true in part because ethical attitudes and dispositions cannot be mechanically transmitted: they are not so much taught as caught.

57. In much the same way Maurice Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological effort to ground philosophy in bodily experience was called a philosophy of irrationalism by his critics.


59. These phrases are Rorty's, I believe, although I can no longer recall where I encountered them. Both describe the "abject relativism" to which I referred earlier.

60. Musical performance and the connection between ethical thought and the construction of identity are given cogent treatment by Eleanor Stubble (1995), pp. 55–69. Indeed, these are important recurrent themes in Stubble's work.

61. Jane O'Dea, for instance, writes specifically of phronesis in music, but seems to stop short of the position being advanced here. "Excellence in musical performance requires the exercise of a species of reasoning and judgment analogous to Aristotelian practical wisdom," she writes (1993 p. 233), emphasis mine. O'Dea's reluctance to recognize music as itself-ethical stems, I believe, from a narrow, practice-specific view of "performance" and of "score" (wherein what performers do is interpret scores) and a failure to recognize music as itself social. Similarly, Elliott (1995, p. 167) suggests that "actions in musical performing parallel our actions in moral affairs." He comes closer than O'Dea to recognizing the ethical nature of music, indicating that "the self-other dialogue that we find at the center of music making is continuous with all other forms of ethical existence" (p. 168), but stops short of finding music itself an ethical encounter—this, one suspects, because of a failure to conceive of music as always also social. Stubble, by contrast, writes of the "... ethical tension experienced as the performer weighs the value of alternative courses of action" (1995, p. 62).

62. Of course there is nothing particularly "new" about this, except, perhaps, that these ideas have validity in the modern world. Both Plato and Aristotle attributed immensely important ethic power for music, which was why it was deemed fundamental to paideia, or character education.

63. Although "the ethical" and "the moral" are not the same, I will mix references to the two in the latter part of this
the point that there can be no musical experience devoid of social significance; that being musically good or right is a strictly intramusical production, and the social requirements of its reception. A musical experience devoid of social significance would not be musical, merely sonorous.

71. That all such enactments are not equally desirable is made abundantly clear by Jacques Attali (1985). R. Murray Schafer's (1976) characterization of the concert band as a purveyor of "herdesque happiness" puts still another spin on this.

72. Butler (1990, p. 142) denies this is simply a rehashing of the existentialist claim that existence precedes essence and that the self is constituted through its acts: "For existential theory maintains a prediscursive structure for both the self and its acts. It is precisely the discursively variable construction of each in and through the other that has interested me here," she adds.

73. The claim to insights into human subjectivity is Langer’s. The claim to self growth is Elliott’s. (Stubley, by the way, writes of self-discovery, self-definition, and identity-in-making—ideas that seem to point in the direction of the claim I make here.)

74. Joseph Kerman (1985, p. 73), writes, "By removing the bare score from its context...the analyst removes that organism from the ecology that sustains it."

75. In view of the widespread contemporary reduction of improvisation and composition to formula or technique, it is probably necessary for me to indicate emphatically that such approaches are not what I refer to here.

REFERENCES


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