Discourse markers in free indirect style and interpreting

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Abstract

This paper contributes to the discussion of how free indirect style (FIS) and interpreter’s renditions are accommodated in a relevance theoretic approach to communication. Within relevance theory, it has been argued that FIS and interpreting are cases of attributive use: FIS representations and interpreters’ renditions are representations of the author’s/interpreter’s thoughts about attributed thoughts. We ask whether this approach can accommodate FIS representations and interpreters’ renditions which contain perspective dependent discourse markers, and in particular whether it captures the role played by these expressions in encouraging the reader/hearer to think that s/he has direct access to the thoughts of fictional characters/original speakers. We apply Blakemore’s (2010) account of discourse markers in FIS to data from interpreter mediated police interviews where renditions include discourse markers added by the interpreter to develop an alternative relevance theoretic account. This allows us to reconcile the hearer’s impression that the interpreter’s voice is suppressed with research in interpreting studies which shows that interpreters are in reality both visible and active co-participants in these exchanges. © 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

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1. Introduction

According to the inferential model of linguistic communication developed first by Grice (1989) and then by Sperber and Wilson (1986/95), verbal communication involves producing a linguistic ‘clue’ from which the audience can derive a representation of the thought or thoughts the communicator wishes to communicate. Since this clue is an utterance with linguistic properties, the process of deriving a representation of the speaker’s thoughts will involve a certain amount of linguistic decoding. However, as Grice and Sperber & Wilson have demonstrated, the linguistic properties of an utterance do not fully determine the speaker’s meaning, and the hearer is expected to use this evidence in conjunction with contextual assumptions in non-demonstrative inferences which yield an interpretation of the speaker’s intended meaning. For Grice, these inferences are guided by expectations which derive from maxims which speakers are expected to obey, but are sometimes deliberately violated (for example, in order to trigger the sort of implicature which Grice believes to characterize figurative meanings). However, for Sperber and Wilson, the act of communicating raises precise expectations of relevance (encapsulated in the definition of optimal relevance) which on their own guide the hearer towards the intended meaning.1

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1 For outlines of Gricean and relevance theoretic approaches to pragmatics, see Wilson (2004), Wilson and Sperber (2012b), Introduction. According to Sperber and Wilson, every act of ostensive communication communicates a presumption of its own optimal relevance, where an utterance is optimally relevant if and only if it:
(a) is relevant enough for it to be worth the addressee’s effort to process it;
(b) is the most relevant one compatible with the communicator’s abilities and preferences.
Because the gap between the linguistically encoded meaning of the utterance and the intended interpretation is filled by pragmatic inference, there can be no guarantee that the interpretation that the hearer recovers is an exact copy of the speaker’s thoughts. It can only be an interpretation of them – that is, a representation which is assumed to resemble the communicator’s thoughts to some extent. Thus in this framework, communicative success cannot depend on the duplication of thoughts, but consists in what Sperber and Wilson (1986/95) describe as the enlargement of the mutual cognitive environments of speaker and audience.2

The aim of this paper is to ask how this picture of communication fares in situations in which the hearer derives the intended meaning not on the basis of the evidence provided by the person (S1) whose thoughts are being communicated, but on the basis of evidence provided by another person (S2). As we shall see in section 2.2, this is the sort of case that arises in free indirect thought representations in fiction. But it is also the sort of case which arises when the evidence produced is an utterance from a language (L1) not understood by the intended audience and is translated by an interpreter (S2) into a language (L2) which is understood by that audience. The examples which form the focus of our paper are from dialogue interpreting, where the audience may have access to other non-verbal behaviours produced by S1 to accompany his utterances. However, the focus is on the role of linguistic evidence in the interaction, and the discussion might equally apply to cases in which the audience has no access to physical evidence of S1 or his original act of communication at all (as, for example, in renditions heard through headphones or on the radio).

According to Gutt (2000) translation and interpreting can be accommodated in the relevance theoretic model of communication described if they are treated as cases of attributive use (Sperber and Wilson, 1986/95), a notion which they have argued is also central to the explanation of indirect and free indirect representations of speech and thought and irony. Thus according to Sperber and Wilson, every utterance is an interpretation of the speaker’s thought, but that thought might be either entertained as a description of an (actual or desirable) state of affairs or as an interpretation of a thought attributed to someone else (or oneself at another time). Thus according to Wilson and Sperber (2012a:129) all of the following are either explicitly or tacitly attributive (the examples are theirs):

(1) John phoned his wife and told her that the train was about to leave.
(2) He was hoping that they would have a quiet evening alone.
(3) An announcement came over the loudspeaker. All the trains were delayed.
(4) The passengers were angry. Would they ever get home?

While (1–2) provide linguistic evidence that the italicized clause is an indirect report of an attributed utterance/thought, (3–4) are tacit representations of attributed utterances/thoughts. As Wilson and Sperber point out, (4) has properties which characterize free indirect discourse (lack of subordination, shifted tense and reference), a phenomenon which we consider in section 2.2. However, the point here is that all of these are analyzed by Wilson and Sperber as utterances which are interpretations of thoughts which themselves are about attributed thoughts, and their relevance lies in the information they provide about the content of the attributed thought. Other attributive utterances achieve relevance in virtue of what they communicate about the speaker’s attitude towards the attributed thought. For example, consider Wilson and Sperber’s examples in (6) and (7) which are possible responses to the utterance in (5):

(5) JACK: I’ve finished my paper.
(6) SUE (HAPPLY): You’ve finished your paper! Let’s celebrate.
(7) SUE (DISMISSIVELY): You’ve finished your paper. How often have I heard you say that?

These are examples of what Sperber and Wilson call echoic use, a notion which is central to their analysis of irony (see Wilson, 2006; Wilson and Sperber, 2012a). The type of attributive use which Gutt has in mind in his relevance theoretic account of translation and interpreting is the one illustrated in (1–4) where the speaker’s intention is to inform the audience about the content of an attributed thought. Thus he argues that translation and interpreting are acts of communication between the translator/interpreter and (de facto) audience which achieve relevance in virtue of being a faithful interpretation of an utterance expressed in another language: the rendered text is an interpretation of the translator’s/interpreter’s thoughts which are themselves an interpretation of the thoughts of the original speaker. And the translator/interpreter, like any communicator, is constrained by the communicative principle

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2 See Sperber and Wilson (1986/95:41–6). A cognitive environment is the set of assumptions which are manifest to an individual at a given time, where manifestness is the degree to which an individual is capable of mentally representing that assumption and holding it as true or probably true at a given moment. A mutual cognitive environment is one which is shared by a group of individuals and in which it is manifest to those individuals that they share it with each other.
of relevance, which, according to Sperber and Wilson (1986/95) governs all acts of ostensive communication (see Gutt, 2000:214).

As Gutt (2000) shows, this approach suggests that one should not expect renditions which are literal equivalents of the original (see also Setton, 1998/2002, 1999; Mason, 2004, 2006a, 2006b). Attributive use involves the use of one representation to represent another attributive representation which it resembles, where this notion of resemblance is defined in terms of resemblances in semantic and implicated content between propositional representations. Thus while Henry’s reply in (9) would not be said to replicate the utterance made by Pauline in (8), it can be understood as a representation of the thought her utterance communicates, since it shares relevant contextual implications with it:

(8) PAULINE: I’m afraid we are going to have to let you go.
(9) ANN: What did she say?
    HENRY: I’m going to be fired.

Since, on this account, “identity is a limiting account of resemblance” and “reproduction is a limiting case of interpretation” (Sperber and Wilson, 1986/95:229), an interpreter aiming to produce a representation which achieves relevance as a faithful interpretation of the thoughts of a speaker who has expressed themselves in another language, may produce a rendition which is not literally equivalent to the source utterance. In particular, the aim of providing a faithful interpretation of the original speaker’s thoughts may result in an utterance which includes the addition of material which does not correspond to anything in the source utterance. For example, the interpreter’s rendition of defendant’s reply in (10) contains the discourse marker well, even though there is no expression corresponding to well in the original Spanish:

(10) DEFENSE ATTORNEY: What kind of house is that?
    INTERPRETER: ¿Qué tipo de casa es?
    DEFENDANT: Es una casa chica.
    INTERPRETER: Well, it’s a small house (Berk-Seligson, 1988:32).

As Berk-Seligson (1988, 1990) and other interpreting scholars (e.g. Hale, 1999, 2004; Tillman, 2009) observe, this is not an isolated phenomenon. And the data presented in section 3 of our paper confirms this.

However, this particular kind of example – one where the added element is a discourse marker which cannot be treated as contributing to the conceptual content of the utterance which contains it – raises a more specific question for Gutt’s approach to translation and interpreting in terms of attributive use. As we have seen, interpretive representations of attributed thoughts exploit resemblances in conceptual content. But according to Blakemore’s (1987, 2002) account, expressions such as well do not encode constituents of conceptual representations. This raises the first question addressed by this paper: how can we explain the presence of expressions whose meanings cannot be analyzed in conceptual terms in a rendition which is (according to Gutt) relevant in virtue of being an interpretation of a thought which is itself an interpretation of the thoughts of the original speaker.

Discourse markers such as well are among a range of expressions which Potts (2007) describes as perspective dependent. Potts is particularly concerned with expressions which he initially claims are necessarily speaker dependent (e.g. damn, bastard). However, he acknowledges that even when these expressions are used in indirect speech or thought reports, there are contexts in which they are interpreted as being linked to the perspective of someone other than the speaker. The point is that expressives such as damn are linked to a particular perspective, and that the hearer is expected to identify whose perspective this is as part of the interpretation process.

While it is unclear whether well can fall within the scope of an indirect thought or speech report, other discourse markers can:

(11) Peter thought that Mary had a holiday, so he should have one too (Wilson and Sperber, 2012:161)

Moreover, as we shall see, any discourse marker can be used in free indirect style or in interpreters’ renditions to represent the perspective of someone other than the writer/speaker. This raises the second question addressed in our paper: how do we account for the role of perspective dependent discourse markers such as well in the relevance theoretic model of communication in cases where the perspective they are linked to is not that of the speaker who uses them?

In section 2, we will consider discourse markers in free indirect thought representations in fiction (cf. Banfield, 1982; Fludernik, 1993), and briefly outline the analysis that has been proposed for this phenomenon by Blakemore (2010). Clearly, there are differences between these cases and the examples from dialogue interpreting discussed in section 3. An author is representing the thoughts of a fictional character, and, moreover, a fictional character who is not communicating, while an interpreter is representing the thoughts of a real person, who may exhibit a range of
communicative (and non-communicative) non-verbal behaviour. Moreover, an author must be treated as a constructed author figure which does not necessarily correspond to a single actual person (since there may be more than one), while an interpreter is a living, identifiable participant in the exchange.3

However, as Blakemore (2010) shows, free indirect style exploits cognitive processes involved in the interpretation of any act of verbal communication – processes which, as Gutt (2000) shows are also involved in audience’s interpretation of the renditions provided by an interpreter. At this level of explanation, expressions such as well can be shown to play a role in renditions such as (10) above which is analogous to the one it plays in the free indirect style representations discussed by Blakemore: they ensure that the audience hears the ‘voice’ of the original speaker (S1) even though his interpretation of S1’s thoughts is based on the evidence provided by another speaker (S2).4 The problem is that when we unpack this idea along the lines suggested by Blakemore (2010), we find that we must depart both from Wilson and Sperber’s argument that free indirect style must be analyzed alongside indirect thought attributions as interpretations of the speaker’s (author’s) thoughts about the thoughts of another, and Gutt’s (2000) claim that interpreting and translation can be accommodated straightforwardly in the model of communication outlined at the beginning of this paper.

In section 4 we conclude the paper by suggesting that this departure may provide a way forward in developing pragmatically grounded notions of interpreter (in)visibility and ‘voice’ which allows us to reconcile expectations encapsulated in by public authorities’ codes of conduct that interpreters should participate in the interaction as an invisible, non-mediating presence “without embellishing or removing information provided” (Greater Manchester Police’s Terms of Engagement, 2010:1) with the observations reported in a studies that interpreters are visible and active co-participants in interactions (cf. Fenton, 1997; Wadensjö, 1998; Jacobsen, 2002, 2008, 2009; Merlini and Favaron, 2003; Angelleli, 2004; Pollabauer, 2004, 2006; Straniro Sergio, 2007; Hale, 2008; Morris, 2008; Berk-Seligson, 2009; Martin and Ortega, 2009).

2. Discourse markers in free indirect thought representations

2.1. Discourse markers and procedural meaning

Blakemore (1988, 1990)’s analysis of the use of well in (10) assumes that it is a hedging device (cf. Brown and Levinson, 1978:172; Leech, 1983:140). Our analyses are based on Blakemore’s (1987, 2002) relevance theoretic account which suggests that the function of well as a hedging device follows from the way in which its semantically defined role as a constraint on relevance interacts with particular properties of the context. As Blakemore (2002) shows, well may be used in different contexts to perform a range of functions. These include the sort of hedging function noted by Berk-Seligson, but also include functions which cannot be analyzed in terms of hedging. Consider for example, the uses illustrated in (12–13) and the well in (14) where it is used to in an attempt to close an argument:

(12) [hearer returns from making an enquiry at a ticket office]
 I: Well?
(13) [someone has just left the room after losing their temper]
 \Well.
(14) [following protracted argument between A & B]
 A: I just don’t think it’s important.
 B: Well, ‘ I \ do. [speaker then leaves room]

According to Blakemore’s (1987, 2002) account, discourse markers such as well do not contribute to the conceptual content of the utterance that contains them, but encode procedures for the recovery of implicatures or constraints on pragmatic inference.5 As Blakemore has argued, this procedural analysis of discourse markers can be justified in terms of Sperber and Wilson (1986/95) communicative principle of relevance. Since a speaker who makes his communicative intention manifest can be assumed to be communicating his assumption that his utterance is optimally relevant, where the degree of relevance is affected both by the outcome (cognitive effects) and by the effort incurred in achieving that

3 However, as Myriam Salam-Carr (personal communication) has pointed out, it is not clear to what extent an interpreter present as a voice heard over headphones would be considered ‘real’ to a hearer.
4 This is not to suggest that all aspects of interpreting can be explained in cognitive terms. Interpreting is a complex form of interaction and involves the interplay of a variety of factors. As we shall see in section 3, cases in which the addition of a discourse marker by the interpreter is intended to represent the perspective of the interpreter must be explained in social interactional terms specific to the social environment in which the interaction occurs.
5 See section 2.2 for details of Blakemore’s (2002) of well.
outcome, the use of an expression that encodes a procedure for identifying the intended interpretation is consistent with the speaker’s aim of achieving relevance for a minimum cost in processing.

As Blakemore (1987, 2002), Wilson and Sperber (1993) and Wilson (2011) have argued, this procedural account has a number of advantages over Grice’s (1989) conceptual account of similar non-truth conditional expressions in terms of conventional implicature. First, in contrast with Grice’s account, it allows us to distinguish discourse markers such as well and so from non-truth conditional sentence adverbials such as seriously or unfortunately which have synonymous truth conditional manner-adverbial counterparts. As Ifantidou (2001) shows, these adverbials encode concepts in both uses, but the concept communicated by the adverbial in the non-truth conditional cases contributes to higher-level explicatures expressing the speaker’s propositional or emotional attitude. As Wilson (2011) points out, this approach enables us to distinguish between lexicalized indicators of epistemic modality or evidentiality (e.g. certain uses of apparently) which are conceptual and contribute to truth conditional content or to higher-level explicatures, and grammaticalized indicators of epistemic modality or evidentiality (e.g. hearsay or interrogative particles) which encode procedural information (cf. Itani, 1993).

Most importantly from the point of view of this paper, the procedural account allows us to explain what Potts’ (2007) has termed the ‘descriptive ineffability’ of expressions such as well: in contrast with the conceptual non-truth conditional adverbials just discussed, discourse markers such as well are notoriously difficult to pin down in conceptual terms. As Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995:172–3) say, expressions which fall on the procedural side of meaning are interpreted by ‘being put into systematic correspondence with states of the user of the language’ (Sperber and Wilson, 1986/95:172–3). Or, as Wilson (2011) puts it, the function of the procedural expressions in a language is to put the user of the language into a state in which any of the cognitive procedures available to human beings are highly activated (and hence more likely to be selected by a hearer using the relevance theoretic comprehension heuristic). In particular, the expressions which are the focus of this paper activate the inferential procedures involved in inferential ostensive communication. Since these procedures are sub-personal and not accessible to our consciousness, it is not surprising that the meanings of expressions which activate them are so elusive from a conceptual point of view. As we show in the following section, this property of expressions such as well and so has interesting implications for the way in which they are exploited by writers of free indirect style for creating the illusion that a reader has direct access to the thoughts of fictional characters.6

2.2. Discourse markers and free indirect style

According to the account just outlined, the use of expressions such as well and anyway is justified in terms of their role in communication: their use provides a means of reducing the effort the hearer invests in recovering the intended interpretation of an utterance, thus contributing towards the recovery of the intended cognitive effects for minimum processing cost. In this sense, they must be treated as being intrinsically communicative. However, in free indirect thought representations these intrinsically communicative or audience-directed devices are used by writers in their representation of thoughts which must be attributed to characters not engaged in the act of communication at all. Consider the well in the representation of Mansfield’s character Linda Burnell’s thoughts in (15) as she sits with her baby son:

(15) And what made it doubly hard to bear was, she did not love her children. […] Even if she had the strength she would never have nursed and played with the little girls. No, it was a though a cold breath had chilled her through and through on each of those awful journeys; she had no warmth left to give them. As to the boy – well, thank heaven, mother had taken him. (Mansfield (1981) ‘At the Bay’, Collected Stories, 223, example from Blakemore, 2010)

Blakemore’s (2010) question is: how do we account for the use of expressions which represent constituents of thoughts in representations of thoughts of fictional characters engaged in private thought?

It might be said that the speaker is producing a representation of an utterance that someone would have made, had s/he voiced or expressed their thoughts. If this is right, then it would seem that in (15) Mansfield has provided a representation not of Linda thinking but of Linda formatting her thoughts for speaking.7

However, an author who is imagining her character thinking is not necessarily imagining a character communicating her thoughts to an audience. When we read Mansfield’s representation of Linda thinking about the way she feels about having children, it is more like overhearing someone speaking to herself than hearing evidence of someone’s communicative intentions. Indeed, it seems that in contrast with direct thought reports, free indirect thought representations contain a range of devices – hesitation, self-interruption, sudden changes in direction, incomplete

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6 For the reasons just outlined it is difficult to see how a reviewer’s claim that Jacobsen (2002) has been able to justify the addition of discourse markers in terms of Grice’s account can be maintained.

7 Thus some writers refer to thought presentation as ‘inner speech’. See for example Leech and Short (2007:270–9).
sentences, reformulations which give the impression of a character struggling to identify his/her emotions – which encourage the reader to interpret them as representations of unconscious thought.

Blakemore (2010) argues that we don’t need to assume that the reader of (15) treats well as a constituent of an utterance that Linda would have made had she voiced her thoughts. Instead, well should be treated as a means of activating processes which result in a representation of Linda’s thoughts and thought processes. In particular, readers are encouraged to access whatever contextual assumptions they believe would justify its use – assumptions which are attributed to Linda, even though they are not actually represented explicitly by Mansfield. According to Blakemore’s (2002) analysis, well indicates that the utterance it introduces is relevant (or yields cognitive effects). In some cases the use of well is justified in a context in which the utterance containing it would otherwise be considered not to be relevant by the hearer. For example, in (16) (from Blakemore (2002)), well is used in a context in which the speaker believes that a ‘yes/no’ answer to the A’s question would yield misleading cognitive effects (e.g. I live in Wellington in the case of ‘yes’ and I have never been to Wellington in the case of ‘no’), and in this way indicates that the utterance is the most relevant one that is compatible with her preference for preventing the sort of confusion which might otherwise ensue.

(16)  A: Do you come from Wellington?
B: Well, I was born there.

Following this analysis, we might say that the use of well in (15) encourages the hearer to access assumptions which derive from Linda’s need to demonstrate that the baby’s presence on her lap does not undermine the relevance of her representation of herself as having no maternal feeling. In other words, the use of well indicates that this is a relevant representation of Linda’s feelings – no matter what one might think given the fact that the baby is there on her lap.

Now, as Blakemore (2010) says, someone could attempt to provide a conceptual account of Linda’s thoughts and thought processes for another reader. However, this would be that person’s interpretation of Linda’s thoughts, and it does not give the reader any responsibility for understanding Linda’s mental and emotional state. In contrast, the use of well gives the reader the responsibility to access whatever contextual assumptions allow him to satisfy the constraint well encodes, and this creates the impression that he has direct access to Linda’s state of mind, or, in other words, it creates the illusion of actually participating in Linda’s thought processes.

This is the key to the role of these expressions in free indirect thought representations: they facilitate the recovery of thoughts and thought processes not represented explicitly in the text – thoughts and thought processes which the reader will attribute not to the narrator/author, but to the character whose thoughts are being represented. By encouraging the reader to draw on his own imagination and his interpretation of earlier parts of the text, they create the illusion that this character is acting out his thought processes in immediate relationship with the reader. In this way, these devices contribute to an impression of emotional immediacy that could not have been recovered from a narrator’s description or interpretation of that state.

But in what sense is the act of producing these representations communication? It would seem that the extension of Sperber and Wilson’s (1986/95) relevance theoretic model to the representation of fictional characters’ thoughts suggests we must treat the narrator as a speaker who produces an attributive utterance which comes with a guarantee that the effort expended by the reader will be rewarded by an interpretation of that narrator’s thoughts. In other words, it suggests that the result of interpreting a representation of a fictional character’s thoughts will be rewarded by the enlargement of the mutual cognitive environment of the reader and narrator.

As we have seen, there are examples of attributive use where the effort of processing the utterance is rewarded by an increased sense of mutuality between the hearer and the speaker. In cases of echoic use (see 6–7 above) the speaker’s utterance will be understood as an interpretation of a thought which is itself an interpretation of an attributed thought, and its relevance lies in the speaker’s attitude towards that thought.

Can we treat free indirect style representations of thought in the same way? Is the sense of mutuality the reader achieves when reading representations of Linda’s thoughts in ‘At the Bay’ a sense of mutuality between that reader and the narrator who we take to be responsible for constructing those representations and the contexts in which they are understood? To what extent can these representations be understood as evidence of the narrator’s point of view?

As Fludernik (1993) observes, fictional texts vary in the extent to which the narrator makes the reader aware of his/her presence. Even Mansfield, whose stories tend to betray few signs of a narrating figure, occasionally allows a narratorial comment. Thus in the excerpt from ‘At the Bay’ in (17) Mansfield represents Beryl’s rather judgmental thoughts as she watches the servant, Alice, walk down the road on her afternoon off, but then we have the more detached narratorial comment ‘But no, Beryl was unfair’ which cannot be attributed either to Beryl or Alice herself (the example is from Blakemore, 2009):
And where did a girl like that go to in a place like this. She supposed Alice had picked up some horrible common larrkin and they’d go into the bush together. Pity to make herself so conspicuous; they’d have hard work to hide with Alice in that rig-out.

But no, Beryl was unfair. Alice was going to tea with Mrs Stubbs who’d sent her an “invite” by the little boy who called for orders. (Mansfield (1981) ‘At the Bay’, The Collected Short Stories, 228, authors’ italics).

Dillon and Kirchhoff (1976) call this phenomenon ‘narratorial intrusion’. As we will see in the next section, there are analogous examples in interpreting data, where the interpreter’s rendition includes a discourse marker not found in the original and which must be attributed to the interpreter rather than the original speaker. However, such intrusions are justified in operational terms external to the aim of providing a faithful rendition of the original utterance, and which contribute to the success of the interaction overall, for instance, by clarifying matters of police procedure. Our focus will be on examples where the discourse marker is understood as evidence for the original speaker’s perspective rather than the perspective of the interpreter, and these are analogous not to (17), but to (15).

As we have seen, even though we know the indirect thought representation in (15) is the product of Mansfield’s imagination, the reward for interpreting it is not an interpretation of what the narrator/Mansfield thinks Linda is thinking, but simply an interpretation of what Linda is thinking. The narrator’s own voice is suppressed, and we are left to explore Linda’s mental life, using the discourse markers and other expressives as evidence for an illusion of the sort of mutuality that we might normally have with communicators in real life.

At this point it might be suggested that we can accommodate the sort of phenomenon we are discussing in this paper by allowing two layers of communication (or, as Leech and Short (2007) put it, different layers of discourse), so that the relevance of an utterance may be understood to lie either in the top (narrator/interpreter’s) layer or in the lower (character’s/ original speaker’s) layer. However, while this may be appropriate for interpreting, where there are two acts of communication (the interpreter’s rendition and the original utterance), it would not be appropriate for free indirect thought representations, where the narrator is producing a representation of a person engaged in private thought. Some authors (e.g. Recanati, 2007) have suggested that communicative acts (e.g. assertion) should be broadened to include private acts of thought. However, a thought is not a communicative act (or part of a discourse), and as Wilson (2006) and Wilson and Sperber (2012a) have argued, since the notion of resemblance underlying a relevance theoretic notion of attributive use is resemblance of content rather than resemblance of form, and an utterance will be understood as an interpretation of an utterance, one can accommodate the representation of attributed thoughts without extending the notion of assertion in this way.

Accordingly, we shall argue that in free indirect thought there is only one communicator – the narrator – but that, as Blakemore (2010) has argued, we must decouple the identity of the individual who is taken to have the responsibility for guaranteeing that optimal relevance can be achieved from the identity of the person whose cognitive environment the reader assumes he shares as a result of investing his processing effort. In contrast with face-to-face communication and first-person narration, where these two functions coincide, in free indirect thought the hearer is rewarded by a sense of mutuality with someone other than the individual who is responsible for orchestrating his interpretation by selecting and organizing material in such a way that the effort of processing will result in optimal relevance.

This is all fiction, of course. The reader is rewarded by a sense of mutuality with characters which do not exist, and which are the product of the author’s imagination. Moreover, the narrator is providing evidence for thoughts of characters which have not themselves provided public evidence of those thoughts. Such privileged access to private thought does not exist in real life.

However, in spite of this, it seems that we can find an analogous phenomenon in interpreting, where we might say there are two acts of communication and the hearer is rewarded by an interpretation of the thoughts of a real person who has provided public evidence (utterances) for those thoughts. However, the point is that without the interpreter’s contribution, the original act of communication cannot achieve optimal relevance: the linguistic evidence that the original speaker provides cannot be used by the audience for the derivation of an interpretation of his thoughts. In this sense it might be said that the relevance of the contribution depends on the interpreter’s act of communication – in much the same way as the relevance of the representation of Linda’s thoughts must depend on Mansfield’s act of communication. At the same time, there are uses of discourse markers in interpreters’ renditions which encourage the audience to derive the impression that he is hearing the ‘voice’ of the original speaker even though his interpretation of the original speaker’s thoughts is in fact based on the evidence provided by another speaker. And it seems that we can accommodate these uses only if we

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9 This would allow Recanati to accommodate free indirect thought and cases of irony in which a speaker is targeting a thought that has not been overtly expressed in his pretence account of irony and free indirect style.

10 Clearly, this raises the question of whether one should distinguish between the (constructed) author and the narrator. Unfortunately, there is no space to discuss this issue here. For further discussion, see Azcel (1998), Blakemore (2013), Currie (2010), and Leech and Short (2007).
decouple the role of ensuring optimal relevance from the sense of mutuality that is achieved as a result of interpreting utterances in accordance with the principle of relevance.

3. Discourse markers in interpreting

3.1. ‘Operational’ renditions of discourse markers

In this section, we turn to the use of two discourse markers – so and well – by interpreters in examples extracted from a large corpus of video-recorded naturally-occurring data provided by Greater Manchester Police, consisting of 9 hours and 32 minutes of transcribed and anonymized excerpts drawn from seven interpreter-mediated police interviews in the UK. These interviews involve four NRPSI-registered interpreters, two language combinations (English-Italian and Portuguese-Italian), and both a (child) victim of robbery and two suspects of murder.\(^{11}\)

As we have said, our primary concern is with examples of interpreted data in which the interpreter adds a discourse marker not found in the original (cf. (10)). The examples we discuss in section 3.2 are only a selection of the examples of this phenomenon. The work from which they are taken (Gallai, 2013), discusses a large range of similar examples involving the addition of so and well, as well as examples involving the addition of other discourse markers. At the same time, this work provides an extensive discussion of cases in which discourse markers found in the original are not translated in interpreters’ renditions.

The idea that the process of translation and interpreting requires additions in the form of explicitation of information not made explicit in the original is a familiar one.\(^{12}\) However, explicitation generally refers to a strategy in which propositional content left implicit by one speaker is made explicit by another. Expressions such as so and well do not encode propositional information, and their addition cannot be treated as a means of making content explicit (at least, not on the relevance theoretic view of explicit content (cf. Carston, 2002)). According Blakemore’s account, they activate inferential procedures involved in utterance interpretation, thus allowing the hearer to recover the intended explicit content for the minimum cost in processing. And the question is why an interpreter should provide such a means when it is not provided by the original speaker.

Discourse markers such as so and well pose particular challenges for a translator or interpreter aiming to provide faithful renditions of utterances from another language. As Blakemore (2002) shows, the functions of such expressions are so contextually shaded that it is impossible to say whether two of these expressions are synonymous without testing their intersubstitutability in all contexts. Moreover, it is not necessarily the case that the range of functions performed by a discourse marker in one language corresponds to the same range of functions performed by a single discourse marker in another language. Consider the distinction between the Japanese markers sorede and dakara, noted by Sasamoto (2008). As Sasamoto observes, either (18) or (19) might be produced by a university professor at the end of a student's presentation. However, while (18) will be understood as a criticism and suggests that the presentation was irrelevant, (19) will be understood as an invitation to finish by summarizing the main results:

(18) Dakara ketsuron wa
DAKARA conclusion TOP
DAKARA what is your conclusion?

(19) Sorede ketsuron wa
SOREDE conclusion TOP
SOREDE what is your conclusion.

Both dakara and sorede would be rendered by the same English discourse marker – so – and the only way of capturing the differences described above would involve the use of prosodic clues or a different utterance altogether, for example, the utterances in (20) (corresponding to the interpretation communicated by (18)):

(20) / So?
    So what?

Given these cross-linguistic considerations, one might expect renditions in which a discourse marker is added or omitted.

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\(^{11}\) Data have been anonymized according to the guidelines set out in the UK Data Archive (Van den Eeyden et al., 2011). While the nature of the offences was not a criterion for data selection, only interviews involving serious crime and crimes with vulnerable victims and witnesses are recorded visually in the UK, and hence these must form the basis of our data. The Greater Manchester Police did not allow Gallai to interview the four interpreters involved; however, it is understood that they had received formal training and had been NRPSI registered for a number of years. See Gallai (2013) for information about the backgrounds of the interviewees and the circumstances of the interviews.

\(^{12}\) See Baumgarten et al. (2008).
However, the examples we present here are cases in which there is a discourse marker in the source language which, from a linguistic point of view, could have been used to perform the function performed by the discourse marker in the interpreter’s rendition but which is not present in the original utterance. The corpus of transcribed data from which our examples are extracted includes a proportion of operationally rendered discourse markers which is in line with the trend reported in previous studies of police interviews (Johnson, 2002; MacLeod, 2010). The examples which we discuss here, however, will involve just so and well.

For example, consider the rendition of the police officer’s use of so in (21) into Portuguese, which is part of a prolonged questioning sequence in an interview featuring a vulnerable child (Manuel), the victim of an alleged robbery:

(21) POLICE OFFICER: So when you were walking out er:: towards the gate (.) he wasn’t er carrying the gun then in his hand?
INTERPRETER: Então quando tu já estavas a fug- a:: andar para o portão er:: ele já não tinha a arma na mão?
So when you were already runn- wa:: walking towards the gate er:: he already didn’t have the gun in his hand?

The background for this exchange is that although Manuel had previously stated that the alleged robber was holding a gun in his hand wrapped around a white cloth, he does not remember whether the robber had the gun when he ran out of the park. The interviewer’s use of so (rendered by Portuguese então) contributes to relevance by activating an inference which has the proposition it introduces as a conclusion. This means that the hearer is encouraged to access whatever contextual assumptions allow him to interpret this proposition as a conclusion, for example (22):

(22) If Manuel did not see the robber holding the gun at the time he ran out of the park, then the robber was not holding a gun.

And the conclusion he derives, namely, (23), achieves relevance by contradicting the assumption communicated by Manuel’s statement earlier in the interview, namely, (24):

(23) The robber was not holding a gun.
(24) The robber was holding a gun.

In this way, the use of então encourages the hearer (Manuel) to construct representations of the police-officer’s thoughts and thought processes even though they have not been communicated explicitly.

Consider now an example of the rendition of the Italian discourse marker allora (which in certain contexts can be translated by well) taken from an interview which features Antonio, who is suspected of the murder of his child. Leticia is the mother of the child, while Anna is the child:

(25) INTERPRETER: L’hanno riparata la la camera di di Anna? no?
Did they sort out Anna’s room? no?
ANTONIO: Allora diciamo che loro hanno fatto un trattamento che (.) secondo: Letícia non è appropriato perché non...
Well you know they carried out a treatment that (.) according to: Leticia isn’t adequate because it doesn’t...
INTERPRETER: Well they did they did er carry out a treatment

This extract is an elaboration of Antonio’s statement that their flat, including Anna’s room, was being treated for mould. It begins with the interpreter’s rendition of a direct question asked by the police-officer. According to Blakemore’s (2002) analysis outlined earlier, the use of allora (well) indicates that the utterance it introduces is relevant, and in this way triggers an inferential process which yields cognitive effects. As we have seen, in some cases the use of well is justified in a context in which the utterance containing it might otherwise be considered not to be optimally relevant. In this case, the optimally relevant answer to the interpreter’s question should be either ‘The room was sorted out’ or ‘The room was not sorted out’. However, it seems that for Antonio, both answers would yield misleading contextual effects: ‘No’ might be taken to suggest that the room had received no treatment for mould at all, while ‘Yes’ would be taken to suggest that the treatment which was carried out was successful. Accordingly, he produces an answer which he recognizes is not the one that is expected, but indicates that it is the most relevant one he can produce in these circumstances. As in (21), the

13 In the interests of brevity, the examples given are extracted from longer extracts presented by Gallai (2013). Moreover, we have simplified the transcriptions made by Gallai (2013) and excluded features of the discourse (e.g. overlapping) which, while of interest in a complete analysis of the interpreters’ renditions, do not contribute to the understanding of the use, and particularly, addition, of discourse markers by interpreters. For full transcriptions, see Gallai (2013).
rendition of the discourse marker by the interpreter gives the hearer (the police-officer) the impression that he has access not only to the content of the utterance produced by Antonio, but also to thoughts and thought processes which can be attributed to Antonio even though they are not communicated explicitly.

3.2. Additions

Not every discourse marker produced by an interpreter is produced as a translation of a discourse marker produced by another speaker. In the first place, there are discourse markers which occur in utterances which are manifestly not intended as renditions at all and hence do not play a role in encouraging the hearer to recover representations of thoughts attributed to someone other than the interpreter. For example, in the following, which involves a Portuguese speaking interviewee who is the victim of an alleged robbery and an English speaking interviewer, the interview was interrupted by the following exchange between the interpreter and the interviewer:

(26) INTERPRETER (TO INTERVIEWER): [...] er I just need to clarify something (.) you said before (.) that you wanted him to ask if he didn't understand the question? or if he didn't know the answer so...
POLICE INTERVIEWER: [yeah]
INTERPRETER (TO INTERVIEWER): Which one? (.) do you want him to clarify if he doesn't understand the question?
INTERVIEWER (TO INTERPRETER): Right ah! that that's what I'm coming up to sorry er my my next rule rule two ((giggles))
INTERPRETER (TO INTERVIEWER): Oh! so the first one was if he does know the answer
INTERVIEWER (TO INTERPRETER): If if he doesn't know the answer er I need him to say I don't know

In this exchange, which is triggered by a misunderstanding on the part of the interpreter, the interviewer informs Manuel that he should follow two “rules”: (a) to say “I don’t know” if he does not know the answer to a question; and (b) to say “I don’t understand” if he does not understand the question. The interpreter thinks that she confused the first rule with the second and interrupts the interview in order to ask for clarification. As in (21), the use of so contributes to relevance by activating an inference which has the proposition it introduces as a conclusion. However, in this case the utterance will be understood as a request to the interviewer to confirm that the proposition it expresses is indeed a contextual implication of what he had just said, and thus that the interpreter had understood his utterance correctly. This confirmation is provided by the interviewer in the final utterance of the exchange.

However, this is not the sort of addition which interests us here. The exchange is between interpreter and interviewer, and assuming communication is successful, it results in the enlargement of the mutual cognitive environments of these two participants. The examples which are of interest to us are cases in which the discourse marker is included in an interpreter’s rendition in order to provide evidence for the thoughts of someone other than the interpreter, and where the role of the discourse marker is to encourage the audience to follow an inferential path which results in the representation of thoughts and thought processes of someone other than the interpreter. In other words, these are additions which are justified to the extent that they result in the enlargement of the mutual cognitive environment of the audience and the original speaker.

Consider first, the addition of so in (27), taken from the initial phase of an interview which involves Leticia, a Brazilian Portuguese speaker, and an English speaking interviewer. Leticia has agreed to speak under caution as a “visitor” – that is, as a suspect with no necessity to arrest, recorded for the purpose of integrity (Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984, s. 24).

(27) INTERVIEWER: And the only thing different about this room (.) is that there is two cameras mounted on the wall
INTERPRETER: A única coisa diferente nesse quarto é que tá: er tem duas câmeras que se vêem nesse quarto
*The only thing different in this room is that there is: er it has two cameras that can be seen in this room*
INTERVIEWER: Okay there’s one behind you there [Leticia]
INTERPRETER: há uma atrás de ti
*there’s one behind you*
INTERVIEWER: And there’s also one there
INTERPRETER: E uma outra aqui também
*And another one here as well*
INTERVIEWER: And they will take a (.) video of our (.) conversation today
INTERPRETER: E então vai gravar (.) vai fazer um video de que se passa aqui hoje
*And so it’ll record (.) it’ll make a video of what’s going on here today*

The discourse marker então (so) indicates that the suspect (Leticia) is expected to follow an inferential route in which the proposition expressed by her utterance is a conclusion derived in an inference in which the propositions expressed by the
previous utterances are premises. However, in contrast with (26), então is used in an utterance intended as rendition of an utterance made by another speaker (the interviewer), and its contribution must be understood in terms of its role in leading the hearer not to a representation of the interpreter's thoughts, but to a representation of that interviewer's thoughts. At the same time, in contrast with (21), the interviewer's own utterance did not contain an expression corresponding to então: the interpreter has added the discourse marker on the basis of her own understanding of the utterance in the context of the ones that had preceded it. The point is that although the addition of the discourse marker reflects the interpreter's understanding of this section of the interview, it is difficult to see how the audience (Letícia) will see its use by the interpreter as a means of leading her to a representation of the interpreter's thoughts about the interviewer's thoughts. Instead, she will simply treat então as a means of making salient an inferential route which can be assumed to reflect the way in which the interviewer is thinking, and, in particular, any contextual assumptions she accesses along that inferential route will be attributed not to the interpreter but to the original speaker. In this way, the addition of the discourse marker is justified to the extent that it contributes to the sense of mutuality between audience (Letícia) and the original speaker (the interviewer) – just as in (21).

In the following extract (involving a Portuguese speaking interviewee and an English speaking interviewer), the interpreter adds the Portuguese marker portanto (so) in her first rendition of the interviewer's utterance and then repeats the added discourse marker in her second attempt to provide a rendition which the interviewee (Manuel) understands. Here, the interviewer is encouraging Manuel to report every detail he can remember, even partial information:

(28) INTERVIEWER: Er:: if you pick a good place to start off perhaps (.:) just before it's happened (.:) and then er and then work your way through (.:) to the police being involved (gestures to indicate beginning and end)
INTERPRETER: Mh (:) er:: seria bom que:: escolher er:: um momento certo para começar a contar a tua história portanto (:) logo antes de ter começado o problema er:: até ao momento em que chegaste à polícia er:: it would be good if:: you picked er:: a specific moment to start telling your story so (:) just before the problem has started er:: until the moment when you arrived at the police
MANUEL: Er:: não percebi ((touches his right temple, puzzled))
Er:: I didn't understand
INTERPRETER: He didn't understand I'll explain again (.:) er:: tens que escolher um momento (:) portanto quando começar a contar a tua história conta a:: parting de (:) um bocadinho antes disto ter acontecido (:) até ao momento em que chegaste à polícia (gestures to indicates beginning and end))
er:: you need to choose a moment(,) so when you start telling your story tell it from:: (:) a bit before this has happened (:) until the moment when you arrived at the police
MANUEL: Bem
Okay

In order to identify the proposition expressed by the utterance introduced by portanto (29a) as a contextual implication derived from the proposition expressed by the previous utterance (29b), the hearer (Manuel) would need to access additional contextual premises, for example, the one in (29c):

(29) (a) Manuel should start reporting the events from the time just before the robbery occurred until the time he arrived at the police station.
(b) Manuel should pick a good place to start his account
(c) A good place to start is the time just before the robbery occurred

However, since portanto is included in the rendition of an utterance which is manifestly intended as a rendition of an utterance made by the interviewer and thus as a faithful interpretation of the interviewer's thoughts, the assumption in (c) will be attributed to the interviewer rather than the interpreter. Moreover, any other assumptions Manuel derives as a consequence of interpreting the utterance in accordance with the constraint encoded by portanto will also be attributed to the interviewer – for example, the assumption in (c) may raise the question of why the moment just before the robbery is a good place to start, and in this way Manuel may be encouraged to access assumptions such as the ones in (29d–e):

(29) (d) By starting at the moment just before the robbery occurred, Manuel will help the interviewer reconstruct the sequence of events.
(e) By starting at the moment just before the robbery occurred, Manuel will ensure that the interviewer knows only about those events which are relevant to his inquiry.

These are, of course, only examples of assumptions which Manuel might derive. Indeed, we have no way of knowing exactly what assumptions Manuel derives any more than Manuel knows that the assumptions he derives are an exact copy of what the interviewer is thinking. Nevertheless, it is clear that portanto does trigger a particular line of processing
and that its addition is justified to the extent that it facilitates the representation of thoughts and thought processes similar to those attributed to the interviewee even though these are not represented explicitly by the interpreter, and in this way contributes to a sense of mutuality between the audience (Manuel) and the original speaker (the interviewer).

We conclude this section by considering two examples in which well is added to renditions of utterances which do not contain a corresponding discourse marker. First, consider the extract in (30). Here Manuel (the Portuguese speaking victim of an alleged robbery) is trying to describe the way in which the alleged robber spoke, and has already described the voice as hoarse:

(30) INTERVIEWER: Right (.) just like the local people [you] mean or…?
  MANUEL: mh e:: que andam sempre
  mh and:: who always go around
  INTERPRETER: como as pessoas locais não é?
  like the local people right?
  MANUEL: Mh (.) que andam sempre de bicicletas
  INTERPRETER: And they’re always riding their bicycles
  MANUEL: E também (.) tinha:: er: nada náo não era nada já:: ia a dizer a mema coisa da voz (.) que era…
  And also ( ) he had:: er:: nothing it was it was nothing I was just:: going to say the same about his voice ( )
  which was…
  INTERPRETER: Mh
  MANUEL: Que era rouca
  Which was hoarse
  INTERPRETER: Yeah he said well I was going to say again his voice was a bit hoarse but er…

Although the interpreter’s use of he said in the rendition of the final utterance of this extract might be to indicate that what follows is a direct representation of Manuel’s utterance, there is no expression which corresponds to well in the interviewee’s utterance. What would justify the addition of this discourse marker by the interpreter?

According to Blakemore’s (2002) analysis, the use of well indicates that the utterance it introduces is relevant and hence guarantees that the hearer will be able to derive cognitive effects. Since optimal relevance is defined within the parameters of the communicator’s interests and abilities, and there are circumstances which may result in the speaker making an utterance which is less relevant than another which he might have made, the use of well is justified by indicating that processing the utterance is worthwhile in circumstances which would otherwise make an optimally relevant interpretation impossible. In this case, the use of well may be taken to indicate that the interviewee believes his description of the voice as a bit hoarse is relevant even though he has already communicated this information – or, in other words, by indicating that it is the most relevant information compatible with his ability to recall and provide information in the current circumstances. In this way, well may encourage the interviewer to access other assumptions which he can attribute to Manuel even though they have not been explicitly communicated, for example, that Manuel is not entirely sure whether the interviewer had taken this description on board earlier on, or even that he is not sure whether he has given this description already. It may also play a role in indicating how difficult Manuel is finding the interview process, and thus provide a window on Manuel’s state of mind.

Even though its use by the interpreter is based on her understanding of Manuel’s utterance in the context of the utterance, it will be taken not as evidence for what the interpreter thinks about Manuel’s thoughts or state of mind, but as evidence for Manuel’s thoughts or state of mind. Like the well in (20), it leaves the hearer free to access whatever contextual assumptions would justify its use – assumptions which he will attribute to Manuel rather than the interpreter. In this way, it creates the impression of mutuality between the interviewer and the interviewee.

Finally, consider the addition of well in the rendition of the Italian utterance produced by Antonio in (31). Here Antonio is explaining that his wife had suffered from a serious ear infection and was advised to undergo surgery before getting pregnant:

(31) ANTONIO: Que- quindi per questo: (..) noi volevamo (.) volevamo questa bambina però: abbiamo sempre aspettato perché (.) se fosse stata (.) grav- er incinta (.) non avrebbe potuto (.) av- er: ricevere l’operazione diciamo
  S- So that’s why: (.) we did want (.) we did want this baby but: we have always waited because (.) if she had been (.) pre- er pregnant (.) she couldn’t have (.) ha- er: undergone the operation let’s say
  INTERPRETER: Ah! we we waited to have the baby because if she had been pregnant well she couldn’t have had the operation
  INTERVIEWER: Okay ( ) s- so is this er a condition with her ears that she’s had obviously before:: ( ) she’d been pregnant
Here, the use of well might be taken as evidence for Antonio’s belief that the interviewer may not fully understand his explanation for deferring the pregnancy, and in particular that although pregnancy might be understood to have many consequences, it was the impossibility of having the ear operation which is most relevant. Thus once again, its addition encourages the hearer (the interviewer) to access assumptions not explicitly communicated – assumptions not only about the way in which the original speaker sees his contribution to the exchange, but also about the way in which he believes the interviewer might see that contribution.

4. Conclusion voice and visibility

In the cases just discussed, the interpreter’s decision to add a discourse marker in a rendition is inevitably based on his/her own understanding of the utterance made by the original speaker – an understanding which may be inaccurate in some respect. The reality is that her rendition is intended as an interpretation of her interpretation of the original utterance. It is this reality which is captured by Gutt’s (2000) claim that translation and interpreting should be treated as examples of attributive use in which the interpreter’s utterances are interpretations of her thoughts about the thoughts of the original speaker. This is in line with recent research in interpreting studies which shows that interpreters are in reality both visible and active.

Nevertheless it seems that the additions we have examined shows that there is a sense in which the interpreter can be said to be aiming at invisibility: her aim in adding a discourse marker which is attributed to the original speaker is to create the illusion that the audience is ‘hearing’ the ‘voice’ of that speaker rather than that of the interpreter. Of course, we cannot understand ‘hearing’ or ‘voice’ literally here. The interpreter is a distinct presence, speaking a different language from the original speaker, and speaking that language in her own voice. At the same time, there does seem to be a difference between the sort of utterance an interpreter makes in cases such as (10), (27–28), (30–31), where the addition creates the illusion of hearing the original speaker’s ‘voice’, and the interruption case in (66), where this is not the case. In order to explain this difference, we must explain what is meant by saying that the audience has the impression that he is ‘hearing’ the ‘voice’ of the original speaker, and this involves a departure from the view of interpreting as a case of attributive use, where the interpreter is assumed to be producing an utterance which is relevant as an interpretation of his/her thoughts about someone else’s thoughts.

Similarly, Wilson and Sperber’s (2012a) analysis of free indirect style as attributive use accommodates the fact that the reader knows that Linda and her thoughts are the product of Mansfield’s imagination, and thus that what s/he is reading is an interpretation of the author’s thoughts and imaginings. However, it does not explain why free indirect style creates the illusion of having direct access to Linda’s thoughts or of ‘hearing’ her ‘voice’ as we read.

As Aczel (1998) says, fictional characters do not really ‘speak’ in written texts. Our suggestion is that in order to explain the illusion of voice in interpreting and free indirect style, we must appeal to the relevance theoretic notion of mutual cognitive environment. According to relevance theory, the act of communicating raises precise expectations of relevance, which guide the hearer towards the intended interpretation. However, as we have seen, communicative success consists not in the duplication of thoughts, but in the enlargement of the mutual cognitive environments of speaker and audience. Blakemore’s (2010) proposal for the analysis of free indirect thought representations was that we should decouple the identity of the individual taken to have the responsibility for guaranteeing that optimal relevance can be achieved from the identity of the person whose cognitive environment the reader assumes he shares as a result of investing his processing effort. In face-to-face communication and first-person narration these two functions coincide. In free indirect style the hearer is rewarded by a sense of mutuality with someone other than the individual who is responsible for communicating the guarantee of relevance and ensuring that optimal relevance is achieved. The more the reader feels that the mutuality achieved as a result of his processing effort is between him and the character whose thoughts are being represented, the more he will feel that he is hearing that character’s voice – in spite of the fact that that character is not actually speaking.

In contrast with free indirect thought representations, interpreting involves two acts of communication – that of the original speaker and that of the interpreter. However, without the interpreter’s contribution, the original act of communication cannot achieve optimal relevance for the audience: the linguistic evidence that the original speaker provides cannot be used by the audience for the derivation of an interpretation of his thoughts. In this sense, the relevance of the contribution depends on the interpreter’s act of communication – in much the same way as the relevance of the representation of Linda’s thoughts depends on Mansfield’s act of communication. However, the result of investing effort in processing the interpreter’s rendition is an impression of increased mutuality between the audience and the original speaker. And the more he feels that the mutuality achieved is between him and the original speaker, the more he will feel that he is hearing the voice of the original speaker – even though he does not understand the linguistic evidence that this speaker has provided.

Here we have focussed on the role of discourse markers in creating the illusion of mutuality. As we have shown, the fact that they give the hearer the responsibility for deriving an interpretation which is consistent with the constraint they encode means that they contribute the sense of mutuality – where this is understood as mutuality between audience and fictional character/original speaker rather than between audience and writer/interpreter.
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