

Propuesta de Curso 2019-1

1. Nombre del profesor: Dra. Nydia Guadalupe Lara Zavala

2. Nombre del curso o seminario: Realismos Científicos Selectivos Contemporáneos

3. Campo del conocimiento: Filosofía de la Ciencia

4. Descripción y objetivos:

El objetivo del seminario es introducir a los estudiantes de posgrado en temas y problemas contemporáneos de filosofía de la ciencia que, en general, son ignorados en los cursos tradicionales de filosofía de la ciencia.

El curso está dividido en tres grandes bloques:

- a) La carga teórica de la observación como preludio al realismo científico
- b) El debate del realismo científico tradicional
- c) El debate contemporáneo de los realismos selectivos

Dependiendo de si las lecturas son dos o tres, se le pedirá a los estudiantes que hagan una exposición primero exegética de los artículos y terminen dando un punto de vista personal para iniciar la discusión en grupo.

Objetivo general

Presentar las distintas corrientes filosóficas en torno a la discusión entre realistas y anti-realistas para que el alumno pueda evaluar críticamente la discusión contemporánea de la filosofía de la ciencia para poder argumentar justificadamente su propia postura.

Objetivos Específicos

Examinar los problemas que involucra la idea de la carga teórica de la observación con respecto al realismo científico.

Revisar el origen filosófico que ha generado los diversos debates en torno al realismo tradicional

Introducir los seis denominados ‘realismos selectivos’ para que se pueda visualizar la problemática del realismo tradicional y se puedan detectar las nuevas líneas de investigación que es necesario empezar a explorar.

Temas y distribución

Semana 1. Antecedentes del realismo científico tradicional: El derrumbe del positivismo lógico: Quine y la visión semántica de la ciencia.

Lecturas esenciales:

Quine, W. V. O. (1961), ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’, From a Logical Point of View, New York: Harper and Row.

Suppe, F. (1972), 'What's Wrong with the Received View on the Structure of Scientific Theories?', *Philosophy of Science*, vol. 39(1): 1-19.

Lecturas optativas:

Putnam, H. (1962) 'What Theories Are Not', *Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science*, E. Nagel et al. (eds.), Stanford University Press, Stanford, pp. 240-251.

French, S. and Ladyman, J., 1999. "Reinflating the semantic approach," *International Studies in the Philosophy of Science*, 13: 103–121.

Semana 2. La carga teórica de la evidencia I.

Lecturas esenciales:

Bogen, James, "Theory and Observation in Science", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Summer 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/science-theory-observation/>.

Brewer, W.F. and B.L. Lambert (2001) 'The Theory-Ladenness of Observation and the Theory-Ladenness of the Rest of the Scientific Process', *Philosophy of Science*, 68(3): S176-S186

Lecturas optativas:

Kosso, P. (1992) *Reading the Book of Nature*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ch. 6.

Hanson, N.R. (1958) *Patterns of Discovery*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ch. 1

Semana 3. La carga teórica de la evidencia II.

Lecturas esenciales:

Sellars, W. (1956), 'Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind', Robert Brandom (ed.), *Harvard University Press.*; Cambridge, MA; 1997.

Fodor, J. (1984) 'Observation Reconsidered', *Philosophy of Science*, vol. 51(1): 23- 43

Lecturas optativas:

Chisholm, R. (1964) 'The Myth of the Given', reprinted in *Epistemology: An Anthology*, J. Kim and E. Sosa (eds.), Oxford: Blackwell, 2000, pp. 107-119.

Semana 4. La carga teórica de la evidencia III.

Lecturas esenciales:

Shapere, D. (1982) 'The Concept of Observation in Science and Philosophy', *Philosophy of Science*, vol. 49(4): 485-525.

Hacking, I. (1985) 'Do We See Through A Microscope?', *Images of Science*, P.M. Churchland and C.A. Hooks (eds.), Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 132-152.

Lecturas optativas:

Woodward, J. (1989) 'Data and Phenomena', *Synthese*, vol. 79(3): 393-472.

Semana 5. Argumentos a favor del realismo científico tradicional (I).

Lecturas esenciales:

Chakravartty, Anjan, "Scientific Realism", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Summer 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.),
URL=<<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/scientific-realism/>>.

Maxwell, G. (1962), 'The Ontological Status of Theoretical Entities', in Feigl and Maxwell (eds.), vol. III.

Smart, J. J. C. (1963), *Philosophy and Scientific Realism*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Lecturas optativas:

Boyd, R. (1984), 'The Current Status of Scientific Realism', in J. Leplin (ed.), *Scientific Realism*, Berkeley: University of California Press

Semana 6. Argumentos a favor del realismo científico tradicional (II).

Lecturas esenciales:

Putnam, Hilary, 1975a, *Mathematics, Matter and Method*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Musgrave, Alan, 1988, "The Ultimate Argument for Scientific Realism", in Robert Nola (ed.), *Relativism and Realism in Sciences*, Dordrecht: Kluwer, pp. 229–252

Lecturas optativas:

Harman, Gilbert H., 1965, "The Inference to the Best Explanation", *Philosophical Review*, 74(1): 88–95. doi:10.2307/218353

Lipton, Peter, [1991] 2004, *Inference to the Best Explanation*, 2nd edition. London: Routledge.

Semana 7. Argumentos a favor del antirealismo (I).

Lecturas esenciales:

van Fraassen, Bas C., 1980, *The Scientific Image*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, C.1.

van Fraassen, Bas C., 1985, "Empiricism in the Philosophy of Science", in Churchland & Hooker 1985: 245–308.

Lecturas optativas:

Psillos, Stathis, 1996, "On van Fraassen's Critique of Abductive Reasoning", *Philosophical Quarterly*, 46(182): 31–47. doi:10.2307/2956303

Semana 8. Argumentos a favor del antirealismo (II).

Lecturas esenciales:

Laudan, Larry, 1981, "A Confutation of Convergent Realism", *Philosophy of Science*, 48: 19–48

Wray, K. Brad, 2015, "Pessimistic Inductions: Four Varieties", *International Studies in the Philosophy of Science*, 29(1): 61–73. doi:10.1080/02698595.2015.1071551

Semana 9. Argumentos a favor del antirealismo (III).

Lecturas esenciales:

Worrall, John, 2011, "Underdetermination, Realism and Empirical Equivalence", *Synthese*, 180(2): 157–172. doi:10.1007/s11229-009-9599-4

Douven, Igor, 2003, "The anti-realist argument for underdetermination", *The Philosophical Quarterly*, Volume 50, Issue 200, 1 July 2000, Pages 371–375,

Lecturas optativas:

Laudan, Larry and Jarrett Leplin, 1991, "Empirical Equivalence and Underdetermination", *Journal of Philosophy*, 88(9): 449–472. doi:10.2307/2026601

Semana 10. Escepticismo contra el debate del realismo científico (I).

Lecturas esenciales:

Fine, Arthur, 1986a, "Unnatural Attitudes: Realist and Antirealist Attachments to Science", *Mind*, 95(378): 149–177. doi:10.1093/mind/XCV.378.149

Carnap, Rudolf, 1950, "Empiricism, semantics and ontology", *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* 4 (1950): 20-40. Reprinted in the Supplement to *Meaning and Necessity: A Study in Semantics and Modal Logic*, enlarged edition (University of Chicago Press, 1956).

Lecturas optativas:

Salmon, Wesley, 1991, "Hempel, Carnap, and Reichenbach on Scientific Realism": Carnap-Reichenbach Centennial,

Fine, Arthur (1984): *The Natural Ontological Attitude*, en Jarrett Leplin (ed.), *Scientific Realism*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 83–107.

Semana 11. Escepticismo contra el debate del realismo científico (II).

Lecturas esenciales:

Howson, Colin, 2000, *Hume's Problem: Induction and the Justification of Belief*, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/0198250371.001.0001. C 1 y 3.

Magnus, P.D. and Craig Callender, 2004, "Realist Ennui and the Base Rate Fallacy", *Philosophy of Science*, 71(3): 320–338. doi:10.1086/421536

Lecturas optativas:

Sprenger, J. [2015]: *The Probabilistic No Miracles Argument*. *European Journal for Philosophy of Science* 6(2): 173-189.

Semana 12. Realismos selectivos (I).

Lecturas esenciales:

Hacking, Ian, 1982, "Experimentation and Scientific Realism", *Philosophical Topics*, 13(1): 71–87. doi:10.5840/philtopics19821314

Ellis, Brian, 1988, "Internal Realism", *Synthese*, 76(3):409–434. doi:10.1007/BF00869609

Chakravartty, Anjan, 1998, "Semirealism", *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A*, 29: 391–408.

Lecturas optativas:

Jones, Roger, 1991, "Realism About What?" *Philosophy of Science*, 58(2): 185–202.
doi:10.1086/289611

Semana 12. Realismos selectivos (II).

Lecturas esenciales:

Frigg, R. And I. Votsis (2011) 'Everything You Always Wanted to Know about Structural Realism but Were Afraid to Ask', *European Journal for the Philosophy of Science*, vol. 1:227–276

Worrall, J. (1989) 'Structural Realism: The Best of Both Worlds?', *Dialectica*, vol. 43(1-2): 99-124.

Demopoulos, W. and Friedman, M., 1985 [1989]. "Critical notice: Bertrand Russell's *The Analysis of Matter: Its historical context and contemporary interest*," *Philosophy of Science*, 52: 621–639. Reprinted in C.W. Savage and C.A.

Anderson (eds.), (1989), *Rereading Russell: Essays on Bertrand Russell's Metaphysics and Epistemology* (Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science: Volume XII). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Lecturas optativas:

Zahar, E. (1996) 'Poincaré's Structural Realism and his Logic of Discovery', in J.-L. Greffe, G. Heinzmann & K. Lorenz (Eds.), *Henri Poincaré: Science and philosophy*, Berlin: Akademie Verlag and Paris: Albert Blanchard.

Maxwell, G. (1970) 'Structural Realism and the Meaning of Theoretical Terms', in S. Winokur and M. Radner (eds.) *Analyses of Theories, and Methods of Physics and Psychology*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 181-192.

Semana 13. Realismos selectivos (III).

Lecturas esenciales:

Dennett, Daniel (1991), *Real Patterns*, *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 88, No. 1. (Jan., 1991), pp. 27-51.

French, Steven, 1998, "On the Withering Away of Physical Objects", in E. Castellani (ed.), *Interpreting Bodies: Classical and Quantum Objects in Modern Physics*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 93–113

Ladyman, James and Don Ross, 2007, *Every Thing Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized*, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199276196.001.0001

Lecturas optativas:

Floridi, L., 2008. "A Defence of Informational Structural Realism," *Synthese*, 161 (2): 219-253.

Esfeld, M., 2004. "Quantum entanglement and a metaphysics of relations," *Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics*, 35: 601–617.

Semana 13. Realismos selectivos (III).

Lecturas esenciales:

Bueno, O., 1999. "What is Structural Empiricism? Scientific Change in an Empiricist Setting," *Erkenntnis*, 50: 59–85.

Morganti, M., 2004. "On the preferability of epistemic structural realism," *Synthese*, 142: 81–107.

Lecturas optativas:

Worrall, J. (1994) 'How to Remain (Reasonably) Optimistic: Scientific Realism and the "Luminiferous Ether" ', in D. Hull, M. Forbes & R. M. Burian (Eds.), *PSA 1994*, vol. 1 (pp. 334–342), East Lansing: Philosophy of Science Association.

Votsis, I. (unpublished) 'Tracing the Development of Structural Realism', <http://www.votsis.org/papers.htm>

6. Criterios de evaluación

Ensayo de tema a elegir 70%

Exposición 20%

Participación 10%

7. Propuesta de día y horario

Lunes 10:00 am a 2:00 pm.

8. Sede

IIFs