

Evidencia y temas en Filosofía de la ciencia

Semana 1: Clases Naturales

Lecturas Obligatorias

Bird A. (2018). The Metaphysics of natural kinds. *Synthese* 195 (4):1397-1426.

Goodman, N. (1954) *Fact, Fiction, and Forecast*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard

Boyd R. (2010). Realism, natural kinds and philosophical methods. En: Beebe H. y N. Sabbarton-Leary (eds.), *The Semantics and Metaphysics of Natural Kinds*. Routledge. pp. 212—234.

Lecturas adicionales:

Cartwright, N. (1999) *The dappled world: a study of the boundaries of Science*,

Cambridge: CUP, pp. 1-19

Galison, P. and Stump D.J (eds) (1996) *Disunity of Science: Boundaries, Context and Power*, Palo Alto California: Stanford University Press

Semana 2 Leyes

Lecturas Obligatorias

Lange M. (2009). *Laws and Lawmakers Science, Metaphysics, and the Laws of Nature*. Oxford University Press

Cartwright, N. (1980) 'Do the Laws of Physics State the Facts?', En Curd y Cover, *Philosophy of science: The central issues*. pp. 865-877.

Dretske, F. (1977) 'Laws of Nature', in Curd and Cover, pp. 826-845.

Lecturas adicionales

- Armstrong, D.M. (1983) *What is a Law of Nature?*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Van Fraassen, B. C. (1989) *Laws and Symmetry*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Semana 3 Explicación científica

Lecturas obligatorias

Strevens M. (2008). *Depth: An Account of Scientific Explanation*. Harvard University Press.

Hempel, C.G. (1962) 'Two Basic Types of Scientific Explanation' in Curd and Cover, pp. 685-694.

Craver C.F. (2014) The Ontic Account of Scientific Explanation. En Marie I. Kaiser, Oliver R. Scholz, Daniel Plenge & Andreas Hüttemann (eds.), *Explanation in the Special Sciences: The Case of Biology and History*. Springer Verlag. pp. 27-52.

Lecturas adicionales

- Kitcher, P. (1981) 'Explanatory Unification', *Philosophy of Science* 48: 507–31.
- Salmon, W. (1984) *Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Van Fraassen, B. (1980) *The Scientific Image*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Semana 4 Evidencia

Lecturas Obligatorias

Kelly, T. (2006) 'Evidence', *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://www.seop.leeds.ac.uk/entries/evidence/>

Goldenberg M (2009). Iconoclast or Creed? Objectivism, Pragmatism, and the Hierarchy of Evidence. *Perspectives in Biology and Medicine* 52 (2):168-187

Lambert F. y J. Biro (2017). What is evidence of evidence of? *Logos & Episteme* VIII: 195-206

Lecturas adicionales

- Achinstein, P. (2001) *The Book of Evidence*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 13- 44.
- Glymour, C. (1980) *Theory and Evidence*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Salmon, M. et al. (1992) *Introduction to the Philosophy of Science*, ch.2, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Suppe, F. (1972) 'What's Wrong with the Received View on the Structure of Scientific Theories?', *Philosophy of Science*, vol. 39(1): 1-19.

Semana 5 El problema de la subdeterminación

Lecturas obligatorias

Norton, J. (2008) 'Must Evidence Underdetermine Theory?', in *The Challenge of the*

Social and the Pressure of Practice : Science and Values Revisited , M. Carrier, D.

Howard, and J. Kourany (eds.), Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 17–44.

Williamson, T. (2000) *Knowledge and its Limits* , ch.9, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 184-208.

Lecturas adicionales

- Laudan, L. and Leplin, J. (1991) 'Empirical Equivalence and Underdetermination', *Journal of Philosophy* , vol. 88: 449–72.
- Conee, E. and Feldman, R. (2004) *Evidentialism : Essays in Epistemology* , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Jackson, F. (2002) 'Critical Notice of *Knowledge and its Limits*', *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* , vol. 80(4): 516–521.
- Stanley, J. (2005) *Knowledge and Practical Interests* , Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Semana 6 Predicciones novedosas/ ¿Ciencia sin evidencia?

Lecturas obligatorias

Hudson, R.G. (2007) 'What's Really at Issue with Novel Predictions?', *Synthese* , vol

155(1): 1-20.

Votsis I. (2014). Objectivity in confirmation. Pot hoc monsters and novel predictions. *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A* 45:70-78.

Feyerabend, P. K. (1969) 'Science Without Experience', *Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 66: 791-94.

Lecturas adicionales

- Brush, S.G. (2007) *Predictivism and the Periodic Table*, *Studies In History and*

Philosophy of Science Part A , vol. 38(1): 256-259.

- Mayo, D. (1991) 'Novel Evidence and Severe Tests', Philosophy of Science , vol. 58: 523-552.

- Worrall, J. (2002) 'New Evidence for Old', in P. Gärdenfors, J. Wolenski and K. Kijania-Placek (eds.), In the Scope of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science , vol. 1: pp. 191–209.

Semana 7 Modelos (I)

Lecturas obligatorias

Gelfert,A.(2016),“Between Theory and Phenomena: What Are Scientific Models?”, How to do Science with models-A Philosophical Primer ,Springer.pp.1-22.

Odenbaugh,J. (2011) True lies: realism, robustness and models “T”, Philosophy of Science, 78(5), 1177-1188

Lecturas adicionales

- Chakravartty,A. (2001) “The Semantic or Model-Theoretic View of Theories and Scientific Realism”, Synthese (2010)172:197–213

Semana 8 Modelos (II)

Lecturas obligatorias

Hughes,R.I.G.(1997)“Models and Representation”, Philosophy of Science 64(4):336

Adam Toon Imagination in scientific modeling (2016). En: Amy Kind (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Imagination. Routledge. pp. 451-462 (2016)

Lecturas adicionales

Knox,E.,(2016)“Abstraction and its Limits. Finding Space for Novel Explanation”, Nous , Vol.50, No.1

Semana 9 Modelos (III)

Lecturas obligatorias

Morgan, M. & Morrison M. (1999) "Models as Mediating Instruments", *Models as Mediators— Perspectives in Natural and social Science*, Cambridge University Press.

Semana 10 Modelos (IV)

Lecturas obligatorias

Knuuttila, T. (2011) "Modelling and representing: An artefactual approach to model-based representation", *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science*, 42, pp.262–271

Rheinberger, H.J. (2015) "Preparations, models, and simulations", *History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences*, Springer.

Semana 11 Causalidad (I)

Lecturas obligatorias

Pearl J. 2000. *Causality: Models, Reasoning, and Inference*. Cambridge University Press.

Woodward J. (2003) *Making things happen*. Oxford University Press.

Lecturas adicionales

Cartwright N. (1989). *Nature's Capacities and Their Measurement*. Oxford University Press

Losee J. (2011). *Theories of causality*. Transaction publishers

Semana 12 Causalidad (II)

Lecturas obligatorias

Russo F. y J. Williamson. (2007). *Interpreting Causality in the Health Sciences*. *International Studies in the Philosophy of Science* 21 (2):157 – 170

Salmon, *Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World*, capítulos 5 & 6

Lecturas adicionales

Schaffer J. "Causes need not be Physically Connected to their Effects: The

Case for Negative Causation," in Christopher Hitchcock, editor, *Contemporary Debates*

in *Philosophy of Science*: Oxford: Blackwell, 2004, pp. 197-216

Dowe P. "Wesley Salmon's Process Theory of Causality and the Conserved Quantity Theory," *Philosophy of Science* 59(2), 1992, 195-216.

Dowe P. "Causes are Physically Connected to their Effects: Why Preventers and Omissions are not Causes," in Christopher Hitchcock, editor, *Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Science*: Oxford: Blackwell, 2004, pp. 189-196.

Semana 13 Causalidad (III)

Lecturas obligatorias

Lewis D (1973). "Causation," *Journal of Philosophy*, 70(17), pp. 556-567.

Menzies P. "Counterfactual Theories of Causation," *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/causation-counterfactual/>)

Lecturas adicionales

Kim J. "Causes and Counterfactuals," *Journal of Philosophy* 70(17), 1973, pp. 570-572.

Lewis D. "Counterfactual Dependence and Time's Arrow," *Nous* 13(4), 1979, pp. 455-47.